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1 
A CALL FOR CHANGE: THE DETRIMENTAL 
IMPACTS OF CRAWFORD v. WASHINGTON 
ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND RAPE 
PROSECUTIONS 
ANOOSHA ROUHANIAN* 
Abstract: In 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Crawford v. Washington that 
testimonial hearsay is inadmissible at trial unless the declarant is available for 
cross-examination. Courts have subsequently struggled to define “testimonial 
hearsay,” but have often vaguely defined it as an out-of-court statement made 
for the primary purpose of establishing past events for use in future prosecution. 
Although Crawford intended to protect a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to 
confrontation, in doing so, it overlooked the holding’s detrimental effects on two 
particular types of victims: domestic violence and rape victims. Under Craw-
ford, domestic violence and rape victims’ out-of-court statements are likely to be 
considered testimonial because the sensitive and personal nature of these inci-
dents often results in substantial deliberation prior to any declaration, as op-
posed to the impromptu declarations made during so-called ongoing emergen-
cies. In turn, these statements are likely viewed as made for future prosecution. 
Moreover, domestic violence and rape victims have especially compelling and 
uniquely fragile psychological reasons to be unavailable for cross-examination, 
including being at risk at for re-traumatization. Yet, despite these reasons, Craw-
ford still places pressure on these victims to be cross-examined in front of their 
perpetrators because testimonial hearsay evidence is often determinative in 
these types of trials, and thus an unavailable victim would lead to an increased 
likelihood of the perpetrator escaping conviction. This sensitivity and conse-
quential unreliability surrounding the admissibility of testimonial hearsay upon 
which domestic violence and rape cases rely also disincentives prosecutors from 
pursuing these cases, further exacerbating the unlikelihood of conviction. To al-
leviate the detrimental impacts that Crawford has on both victims and trials, this 
Article suggests that Crawford’s essential terminology must be narrowly de-
fined, exceptions to the ruling must be expanded upon, and victims must be ad-
equately safeguarded. 
                                                                                                                           
 © 2017, Anoosha Rouhanian. All rights reserved. 
 * The George Washington University Law School, J.D. 2014; University of Maryland, B.A. 
2010. I am grateful to my family members for their unconditional support, to the Rape, Abuse & 
Incest National Network (RAINN) for all of the wonderful work that it does, and to the Boston 
College Journal of Law & Social Justice editorial staff members for their feedback and edits. 
2 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 37:1 
INTRODUCTION 
 The U.S. Supreme Court’s 2004 decision in Crawford v. Washington 
has significantly impacted domestic violence and rape victims throughout 
the United States in a variety of negative ways.1 By interpreting the Con-
frontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution to mean 
that testimonial out-of-court statements are inadmissible at trial unless the 
declarant is available for cross-examination, Crawford effectively prevents 
admissibility of statements made to first-responders by domestic violence 
and rape victims who become afraid to face their attackers at trial or are 
coerced into succumbing to their abusive relationships. In creating this bar-
rier to admission of such crucial evidence, Crawford not only presents de-
fendants with an advantage considering the inherent fear their domestic vio-
lence and rape victims have of confronting them, but it also disincentives 
prosecutors from pursuing these cases in the first place, thereby increasing 
the likelihood that perpetrators of domestic violence and rape will go free. 
Consequently, not only are domestic violence and rape victims harmed by 
the psychological consequences of the crimes committed against them, such 
as fear, depression, and coercion, but Crawford also further punishes vic-
tims by allowing the psychological nature of rape and domestic violence to 
disadvantage them in the judicial system. At the same time, their attackers 
are going free and are able to subsequently harm them again and attack new 
victims. Ultimately, Crawford places the responsibility of conviction, or 
lack thereof, on the shoulders of the victim, and thereby further exacerbates 
the psychological consequences of domestic violence and rape. To alleviate 
the detrimental effects that the Crawford framework has created for domes-
tic violence and rape victims and trials, the definition of testimonial must be 
narrowed, the ongoing emergency exception to Crawford must be broad-
ened, all states must codify the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception, and 
existing statutes providing protection for victims testifying at trial must be 
reformed.2 
This Article proceeds in four primary parts. Part I examines the status 
of the law surrounding hearsay leading up to the Crawford holding and sub-
sequently discusses Crawford in depth. It also analyzes the resultant conse-
quences of the Crawford holding, including the consolidated holdings of 
Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana, which attempt to define 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004). 
 2 See Joan S. Meier, Davis/Hammon, Domestic Violence, and the Supreme Court: The Case for 
Cautious Optimism, 105 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 22, 25–26 (2006), http://repository.
law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1112&context=mlr_fi [https://perma.cc/W3YQ-MTR4]. 
Joan Meier is the co-author of the only amicus brief filed in Davis v. Washington, which expands 
upon the Crawford holding. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822, 823, 826–28, 829–30 
(2006) (attempting to define a testimonial statement post-Crawford). 
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Crawford’s key element of testimonial. Other consequences examined in-
clude the reassessment of the significance placed on the reliability of hear-
say statements, the application of Crawford in relation to the forfeiture by 
wrongdoing exception, and the criticism of the inconsistent jurisprudence 
following Crawford and its inconclusive standards. 
 Part II posits that in effect, Crawford’s intent is undermined in domes-
tic violence cases. This is particularly due to the circumstances presented by 
such cases, including their defining attributes of cyclicality and control, as 
well as the psychological pain and lack of judicial justice that Crawford can 
force upon domestic violence victims. In contrast, Part III presents the of-
ten-overlooked application and impact of Crawford on rape cases. It ex-
presses the need to distinguish the application of Crawford to domestic vio-
lence cases from its application to the unique context of rape cases by de-
lineating various ways in which rape cases differ from domestic violence 
cases and scrutinizing why these divergent cases call for a separate analysis.  
Part IV addresses various proposed solutions to the problems presented 
by Crawford’s application to domestic violence and rape cases. It suggests 
that the definition of testimonial should be restricted in the domestic violence 
and rape contexts to allow for a narrower, objective application rather than a 
broad, discretionary case-by-case application. Other solutions include ex-
panding the definition of ongoing emergency to include statements made 
within twenty-four hours after an incident of domestic violence or rape, codi-
fying the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine to ensure its consistent and con-
tinuous implementation by courts, and finally, improving safeguards for do-
mestic violence and rape victims both before and during trial. 
I. THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON 
A. Hearsay Statements Prior to Crawford 
The Federal Rules of Evidence define hearsay as a statement, verbal or 
non-verbal, that “the declarant does not make while testifying at the current 
trial or hearing; and a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the mat-
ter asserted in the statement.”3 In its most basic form, hearsay is a previous-
ly made out-of-court statement being introduced as evidence to prove the 
truth of the statement. Although hearsay is generally inadmissible in court, 
the Federal Rules of Evidence include many exceptions to this convention 
                                                                                                                           
 3 FED. R. EVID. 801(a)–(c) (defining declarant as “the person who made the statement”). The 
Federal Rule of Evidence defining hearsay, Rule 801(d), “properly carries a strong presumption of 
legitimacy [because] it was proposed by a distinguished Advisory Committee, was enacted by 
Congress after a nearly two-year review, has been adopted by thirty-four states, and has been the 
law for over thirty-five years.” Sam Stonefield, Rule 801(d)’s Oxymoronic “Not Hearsay” Classi-
fication: The Untold Backstory and a Suggested Amendment, 2011 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1, 5 (2011). 
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that render certain hearsay statements admissible.4 These exceptions are 
derived from common law and are typically premised on trustworthiness 
and reliability.5 Under these hearsay exceptions, out-of-court statements can 
be admissible at trial even when the declarant is not present.6  
In contrast, the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution, which guarantees the accused the right to confront those 
who make statements against him or her, requires the availability of declar-
ants at trial for their out-of-court statements to be admitted.7 Since the enact-
ment of the Sixth Amendment, courts have elaborated upon what qualifies as 
an adequate cross-examination. Cross-examination is satisfied when a willing 
witness is questioned under oath on a stand.8 It is also well established that a 
declarant’s testimony made in a preliminary hearing is admissible at a current 
trial even if the declarant is no longer available.9 This is because the declar-
ant’s presence at the preliminary hearing adequately provides a defendant 
with an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.10 Historically, the Sixth 
Amendment’s objectives are to ensure consistency of declarants’ statements 
and to allow a face-to-face encounter between the accuser and the accused, 
which shall assist jurors in judging the credibility of declarants and the accu-
satory or incriminatory claim(s) a declarant has made against the defendant.11 
                                                                                                                           
 4 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803–804. 
 5 See id. 
 6 Id. 
 7 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (guaranteeing a criminal defendant the right to confront those who 
make claims and allegations that are adverse to the defendant’s interests); Crawford v. Washing-
ton, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004) (holding the Sixth Amendment’s confrontation right requires defend-
ant’s accuser(s) be available for cross-examination at trial unless some other exception applies). 
 8 United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 560 (1988). 
 9 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58–59 (holding cross-examination at a preliminary hearing, or a 
hearing prior to trial to determine sufficiency of evidence, satisfies the Confrontation Clause be-
cause it still serves the purpose of allowing the defendant to face his or her accuser(s) and call into 
question the declarant’s credibility); see also Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242–43 
(1895) (ex parte affidavits and depositions do not qualify as cross-examinations). 
 10 See Melissa Moody, A Blow to Domestic Violence Victims: Applying the “Testimonial 
Statements” Test in Crawford v. Washington, 11 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 387, 391–92 
(2005). Some states have gone further and held that even if the declarant is available to testify at 
trial but claims to not remember his or her original testimony from the preliminary hearing, then 
the testimony from the preliminary hearing is admissible at trial and does not violate the defend-
ant’s right to confrontation. See People v. Stewart, No. 246334, 2004 WL 1778525, at *2–4 
(Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2004). Other cases have gone as far as holding that even if a transcript of 
the declarant’s testimony at the preliminary hearing is not available, then eyewitness testimony of 
the declarant’s testimony at the preliminary hearing is constitutionally admissible at trial. See People 
v. Ali Al-Timimi, No. 245211, 2004 WL 1254271, at *2–6 (Mich. Ct. App. June 8, 2004) (holding 
even the examining magistrate could testify at trial regarding personal observations of the wit-
ness’s testimony at the preliminary hearing where no preliminary hearing transcript was availa-
ble). 
 11 Mattox, 156 U.S. at 242–43. 
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These objectives are deemed satisfied through cross-examination, whether 
performed at trial or at a preliminary hearing. 
There is an apparent tension between the intersection of hearsay and 
the Sixth Amendment. Although the Federal Rules of Evidence can admit 
hearsay regardless of a declarant’s availability, the U.S. Constitution’s Con-
frontation Clause prohibits admission of hearsay without the availability of 
the declarant.12 Thus, a particular conflict arises when the hearsay declarant 
is unavailable because the court is presumably left without evidence that is 
pertinent to the trial.  
The U.S. Supreme Court addressed this issue in 1980 in Ohio v. Rob-
erts, where a transcript of an unavailable witness’s previously-provided tes-
timony was admitted at trial in lieu of the witnesses being present to testi-
fy.13 The Court held that an out-of-court statement made by a declarant who 
is unavailable to testify in court is still admissible if there are either indica-
tions of reliability, meaning the hearsay statement falls under a firmly-
rooted hearsay exception, or if the circumstances under which the statement 
was made bear indications that the statement is honest or trustworthy.14 
When calling for classification under a firmly-rooted hearsay exception, the 
Court essentially stated that in order for an unavailable declarant’s hearsay 
statement to be admissible at trial, it must squarely fit within a traditional 
and established hearsay exception that is uniformly applied by courts.15 Ad-
ditionally, when calling for hearsay statements to have guarantees of trust-
worthiness, the Court explained that the context in which a statement was 
made could not have allowed for dishonesty or pretense.16  
Overall, the Roberts holding proved compatible with the Federal Rules 
of Evidence regarding hearsay because both protected the admissibility of 
certain out-of-court statements.17 The decision, however, faced criticism, 
particularly from U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia who viewed 
the Roberts test as far too lenient and one that favored prosecutors.18 Justice 
                                                                                                                           
 12 Compare U.S. CONST. amend. VI (requiring defendant be allowed to confront declarant 
testifying against the defendant), with FED. R. EVID. 803–804 (admitting hearsay at trial regardless 
of declarant’s presence). 
 13 448 U.S. 56, 58–60 (1980). 
 14 FED. R. EVID. 801(a) (hearsay statements can be verbal or non-verbal); Roberts, 448 U.S. at 
66–67 (explaining the purpose of the Confrontation Clause is to allow the defendant to “test ad-
verse evidence”).  
 15 See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63–66 (holding examples of firmly-rooted hearsay exceptions 
include excited utterances under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(1), present sense impressions un-
der Federal Rule of Evidence 803(2), and statements made for a medical diagnosis under Federal 
Rule of Evidence 803(4)). 
 16 Id. at 66. 
 17 FED. R. EVID. 801–803; Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. 
 18 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61–63 (2004) (arguing the Roberts reliability 
test was far too “amorphous” and diluted the Sixth Amendment’s historical intent of specifically 
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Scalia advocated for returning to the Sixth Amendment’s original and his-
torical intent of focusing on pure cross-examination as the means to achieve 
confrontation; he did not consider the reliability of hearsay as a fair or suffi-
cient substitute for cross-examination, and therefore believed the admissi-
bility of hearsay without the availability of the declarant would entirely cir-
cumvent the Confrontation Clause.19 According to Scalia, although reliabil-
ity is an underlying goal of the Confrontation Clause, it must not also be 
used as the means of achieving that very goal.20 Scalia claimed that admit-
ting hearsay of a declarant who is unavailable for cross-examination would 
create a broad and discretionary loophole through which defendants’ Sixth 
Amendment rights would be bypassed. As a result, defendants would be 
deprived of the opportunity to face their accusers, which, in turn, would 
diminish assurance of reliability.21 
B. Overview of Crawford 
More than two decades later, in 2004 Justice Scalia overruled Roberts 
in Crawford v. Washington. Since then, Crawford has been the authoritative 
framework courts use to interpret and apply the Confrontation Clause of the 
Sixth Amendment and the Federal Rules of Evidence relating to hearsay 
statements made by an unavailable declarant.22 In Crawford, the defendant, 
Mr. Crawford, was charged with assault and attempted murder after stab-
bing a man who allegedly tried to rape his wife.23 At trial, the prosecution 
attempted to present tape-recorded statements made by Mr. Crawford’s wife 
that implicated Mr. Crawford in the assault and attempted murder.24 After 
applying the criteria established in Roberts, the trial court permitted the 
prosecution to present such evidence despite the fact that Mrs. Crawford 
was unavailable as a witness due to the marital privilege.25 The trial court 
reasoned that because Mrs. Crawford made the implicating statements dur-
ing a lawful and aptly-timed police interrogation, particularly because she 
                                                                                                                           
placing importance on cross-examination as the means to satisfy a defendant’s right to confronta-
tion). 
 19 See id. at 61. 
 20 See id. 
 21 See id. at 62. 
 22 See id. at 44–45 (explaining the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh who was ultimately beheaded 
after being denied his request to confront his co-conspirator whose statements led to Raleigh’s 
conviction as the historical impetus for the Confrontation Clause). Crawford has “ushered in a sea 
[of] change in confrontation jurisprudence, casting doubt on standard operating procedures in 
thousands of criminal courtrooms every day.” Meier, supra note 2, at 22. 
 23 541 U.S. at 38. 
 24 Id. at 39–40. 
 25 Id. at 40–41 (explaining in Washington state, a spouse can only testify against his or her 
defendant spouse if there is consent or if the spouse is the plaintiff). 
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was read her Miranda rights and spoke after being given time to regain 
composure, the statement did not fall under any hearsay exception.26 Thus, 
the trial court admitted the wife’s statements based on trustworthiness.27 
On appeal, the Washington Court of Appeals reversed Crawford’s con-
viction on the grounds that the wife’s statements were unreliable and should 
have been inadmissible.28 In making this determination, the Washington 
Court of Appeals applied a nine-factor test of trustworthiness and found that 
the wife’s statements were not trustworthy for reasons such as inconsistency 
with previous statements, poor questioning methods, and memory recall 
issues.29 Upon further appeal, however, the Washington Supreme Court then 
reinstated the conviction based on reasoning reflecting that of the trial 
court—that although the wife’s statements did not fall under a hearsay ex-
ception, they were indeed trustworthy.30 
Justice Scalia writing for the majority, the U.S. Supreme Court re-
versed Crawford and remanded the case, holding that admitting Mrs. Craw-
ford’s statements was a violation of Mr. Crawford’s Sixth Amendment right 
to confront his accuser.31 In delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice 
Scalia was highly critical of Roberts and its focus on reliability for being 
not only lenient and malleable, but also misguided.32 He specifically argued 
that complications arise when prosecutors are given discretion to make the 
subjective determination of whether the highly idiosyncratic circumstances 
surrounding a crime represent a context in which statements spoken can be 
deemed reliable or trustworthy. Justice Scalia emphasized that reliability of 
witness statements should not be used as a tool to determine whether the 
Confrontation Clause is satisfied but rather, the Confrontation Clause 
should be used as tool to determine whether witness statements are relia-
                                                                                                                           
 26 Id. 
 27 See id. 
 28 State v. Crawford, No. 25307-1-II, 2001 WL 850119, at *1, 4–6 (Wash. App. July 30, 
2001), rev’d, 54 P.3d 656 (Wash. 2002), rev’d, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 29 See id. at *4–6 (applying a nine-factor asking: 1) whether the declarant had an apparent 
motive to lie; 2) whether the declarant’s general character suggests trustworthiness; 3) whether 
more than one person heard the statement; 4) whether the declarant made the statement spontane-
ously; 5) whether the timing of the statement and the relationship between the declarant and the 
witness suggests trustworthiness; 6) whether the declarant’s statement contained express asser-
tions of past facts; 7) whether cross-examination could help to demonstrate the declarant’s lack of 
knowledge; 8) whether there is a possibility that the declarant’s recollection was faulty because 
the event was remote; and, 9) whether the circumstances surrounding the statement suggest that 
the declarant misrepresented the defendant’s involvement).  
 30 Crawford, 54 P.3d at 658. 
 31 541 U.S. at 68–69. 
 32 See id. at 65–67. 
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ble.33 The Confrontation Clause, according to Justice Scalia, was enacted to 
prevent use of “ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused.”34  
Justice Scalia advocated that more weight should be given to the Con-
frontation Clause’s objective of providing defendants with a fair and just 
opportunity to face their accusers, as guaranteed by the Constitution, rather 
than admitting hearsay via the Federal Rules of Evidence, as Roberts did. 
Justice Scalia emphasized the importance of narrowing the circumstances 
under which hearsay is admissible through the Sixth Amendment, as well as 
the importance of protecting the constitutional right to confront one’s ac-
cuser. Thus, Justice Scalia’s criticism of Roberts chipped away at the in-
creased prosecutorial power that Roberts allowed for and instead, through 
Crawford, he empowered the accused with the opportunity he believed 
rightfully belongs to defendants per the Sixth Amendment. 
The Crawford Court redefined the application of the Confrontation 
Clause by holding that, rather than depending on the reliability of the out-
of-court statement at issue, the Confrontation Clause first requires an analy-
sis of whether a hearsay statement is testimonial in nature before determin-
ing that a defendant’s right to confrontation is in jeopardy.35 Under a Craw-
ford examination, an out-of-court statement is considered testimonial if it 
was “made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness to 
reasonably believe that the statement would be available for use at a later 
trial” or was made “with an eye toward trial.”36 The Court declined to adopt 
a precise or comprehensive formulation of what is considered testimonial, 
but did articulate that, at a minimum, testimonial statements include those 
made “at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and 
police interrogations.”37 If an out-of-court statement is deemed testimonial, 
then its admission violates the Confrontation Clause unless the declarant testi-
fies at trial or, if the declarant is unavailable, the defendant had a prior oppor-
tunity to cross-examine the declarant.38 In contrast, if the hearsay statement is 
considered non-testimonial, the Court noted it would be more accepting of 
                                                                                                                           
 33 See id. 
 34 Id. at 50. 
 35 Id. at 59, 61, 68 (clarifying that the Confrontation Clause is satisfied by cross-examination, 
and thus the terms “confront” and “cross-examine” are essentially synonymous and both are what 
signify the “availability” as referenced in the holding). 
 36 Id. at 51–52, 56 n.7; see Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006) (describing “eye-
toward-trial” statements as ones that detail past events, including those that accuse or implicate a 
perpetrator, and primarily aim to gather evidence for prosecution). 
 37 541 U.S. at 68. The Court acknowledged that it left “for another day any effort to spell out 
a comprehensive definition of ‘testimonial.’” Id. The Court further recognized this open definition 
would create uncertainty in lower courts, but stated this uncertainty was preferable to the status 
quo. Id. 
 38 Id. 
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discretionary standards to determine admissibility, such as those used in 
Roberts.39  
Ultimately, Crawford set precedent that caused great confusion sur-
rounding those statements that fall within a hearsay exception but violate 
the Confrontation Clause due to their testimonial features. Consequently, 
courts lack consistent guidelines as to when to admit hearsay statements of 
an unavailable declarant. As a result of this inconsistency and uncertainty, 
courts are likely hesitant to admit such statements, which are oftentimes 
crucial or incriminating pieces of evidence at trial. Consequently, Crawford 
has created a greater difficulty in obtaining convictions in cases where de-
clarants are unavailable for cross-examination. 
C. Testimonial and Non-Testimonial Statements Under Crawford 
Following the Crawford Court’s decision that provided little guidance 
on how to delineate the difference between testimonial and non-testimonial 
hearsay statements, numerous Supreme Court cases have since attempted to 
draw the distinction.40 Two of these cases, Davis v. Washington and Ham-
mon v. Indiana, were decided just two years after Crawford in 2006.41 Davis 
and Hammon are factually quite similar—both involved a victim of domes-
tic violence making statements about her attacker to law enforcement per-
sonnel.42 The key distinction between these cases is that in Davis, the de-
clarant’s statements were made to a 911 operator as the emergency was oc-
curring.43 In the telephone call, the victim was describing her attacker and 
seeking immediate help in fear of her safety.44 In contrast, in Hammon, the 
declarant’s statements were made once the attack had ceased.45 The victim 
                                                                                                                           
 39 See id.  
 40 See Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2183 (2015) (finding that statements made by a child in 
response to a teacher questioning the child about possible abuse were non-testimonial because the 
primary purpose of the conversation was to protect the child from abuse by identifying the abuser, 
not to gather evidence for prosecution); Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 652 (2011) 
(holding the report of a laboratory analyst was testimonial hearsay, and thus the analyst must be 
available for cross-examination at trial in order to satisfy the Confrontation Clause); Michigan v. 
Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 383–95 (2011) (holding a dying declarant’s statements made to a police 
officer were non-testimonial because they fell under the ongoing emergency exception of hearsay 
rules, and thus were admissible in court despite the unavailability of the declarant); Melendez-
Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 305, 324 (2009) (holding laboratory reports deeming the 
substance at hand as cocaine were testimonial affidavits, and thus required the availability of a 
witness at trial for cross-examination); Davis, 547 U.S. at 822 (holding that declarant’s statements 
to emergency responders were non-testimonial because declarant was seeking emergency assis-
tance). 
 41 Davis, 547 U.S. at 822. On certiorari, the Court consolidated these two cases.  
 42 Id. at 817–21. 
 43 Id. at 817–18. 
 44 See id. 
 45 Id. at 819–20. 
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spoke with police and provided an affidavit after the domestic violence in-
cident had occurred and after the victim had been separated from her at-
tacker.46 
In Davis and Hammon, the Court held that whether a statement is con-
sidered testimonial, and therefore subject to the Confrontation Clause, de-
pends on the “primary purpose” behind the statement.47 The Court defined a 
testimonial statement as one where the primary purpose of the interrogation 
is to establish or prove past events with an “eye toward trial,” meaning the 
statement was made for the purpose of gathering evidence and would be 
potentially relevant to a later criminal prosecution.48 This would include 
statements made regarding a past emergency, such as statements made dur-
ing a formal police interrogation.49 Such statements that fall under the defi-
nition of testimonial call for the declarant to be available for cross-
examination at trial.50 In contrast, if the declarant makes a statement during 
the course of an ongoing emergency, meaning the declarant describes 
events as they are occurring for the purpose of seeking help due to fear for 
his or her safety, the statement is reactive and could not have been made 
with an “eye toward trial.”51 Therefore, that type of statement is non-
testimonial and is admissible at trial notwithstanding the unavailability of 
the declarant.52  
 In Davis and Hammon, the Court applied the aforementioned test and 
ultimately reached entirely different results despite the similar factual histo-
ries of these cases.53 In Davis, the Court held that the declarant’s statements 
were non-testimonial because they were made during an ongoing emergen-
cy for the purpose of seeking help, not for the purpose of gathering evi-
dence.54 In Hammon, the Court found the statements to be testimonial be-
cause they were made after the danger had passed, and thus were more 
closely associated with gathering evidence for trial rather than for seeking 
emergency assistance.55 The Hammon declarant was merely “telling a story 
about the past” that provided evidence that could be used in a prosecution.56 
                                                                                                                           
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. at 822. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id.; Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 (2004). 
 50 Davis, 547 U.S. at 822. 
 51 See id. at 822–23, 828. 
 52 Id. at 822; Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52. 
 53 See Davis, 547 U.S. at 826–28, 829–30.  
 54 Id. at 828. 
 55 Id. at 830 (holding statements in Hammon to be testimonial despite police questioning 
occurring at scene of attack and certain formalities, such as Miranda warnings and interrogation 
recording). 
 56 Id. at 831. 
2017] A Call for Change in Domestic Violence and Rape Prosecutions 11 
 Given the equivocal guidelines regarding how to determine one’s pri-
mary purpose, Crawford, Hammon, and Davis left unclear whether state-
ments made to non-law enforcement personnel are testimonial in nature, but 
most courts have held they are not.57 Despite this nearly uniform agreement, 
it is still an open question. Currently, however, because statements made to 
non-law enforcement personnel do not necessarily or consistently fit 
squarely within Crawford, Davis, and Hammon’s requirement that non-
testimonial statements are not made with the primary purpose of establish-
ing past events with an “eye toward trial,” statements made to non-law en-
forcement personnel are subject to a discretionary, case-by-case Roberts-
like analysis that evaluates whether they are admissible for purposes of the 
Confrontation Clause.58 Consequently, because Roberts affords more leni-
ency than Crawford for determining what constitutes admissible hearsay, as 
Justice Scalia recognizes, it is more likely that such statements will be ad-
mitted at trial.59 Therefore, hearsay statements made to someone such as a 
family member, friend, neighbor, social worker, or medical personnel are 
left “relatively unconstrained by Crawford and Davis.”60As a result, courts 
generally hold that that statements obtained by non-law enforcement per-
sonnel are non-testimonial because such persons are not seeking infor-
mation for judicially investigative purposes or with an “eye toward trial.”61 
However, even with this general application of how to consider state-
ments made to non-law enforcement personnel, Davis and Hammon never 
clarify whose intent controls when the statement is made—the declarant or 
the listener.62 Although some, including Justice Scalia, state that focusing 
on the declarant’s intent when speaking is too subjective, and thus the focus 
should instead be placed on the purpose of the listener or the government 
when applying the primary purpose test, others claim that not considering the 
                                                                                                                           
 57 Id. at 822; Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60–68; Rankins v. Commonwealth, 237 S.W.3d 128, 131 
n.6 (Ky. 2007) (recognizing that neither Crawford nor Davis limit testimonial evidence to state-
ments gathered by law enforcement). 
 58 Davis, 547 U.S. at 834 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing the primary purpose test intro-
duced in Davis and Hammon is just as discretionary and unreliable as the Roberts test); Ohio v. 
Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 77 (1980). 
 59 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53–54 (explaining how Roberts provides more prosecutorial power 
due to the flexibility it grants prosecutors in terms of claiming reliability). 
 60 See Meier, supra note 2, at 25. 
 61 See, e.g., State v. Her, 750 N.W.2d 258, 265 (Minn. 2008) (holding that, in a domestic 
violence murder case, the State did not prove the victim’s statements were non-testimonial be-
cause it did not prove that the primary purpose of these statements was to address an ongoing 
emergency). 
 62 See Andrew Dylan, Working Through the Confrontation Clause After Davis v. Washington, 
76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1905, 1918–21 (2007) (citing Robert P. Mosteller, Davis v. Washington and 
Hammon v. Indiana: Beating Expectations, 105 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 6, 9 (2006), 
http://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1115&context=mlr_fi [https://perma.
cc/62VL-2SA7]). 
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declarant’s purpose leaves room for government manipulation.63 These dif-
fering interpretations following Davis and Hammon leave unsettled whose 
intent or purpose controls—the declarant or the government listener—when 
analyzing whether a statement is made with the primary purpose of gather-
ing evidence for subsequent prosecution.64 
D. Crawford’s Effect on Hearsay Exceptions 
Prior to Crawford, the Roberts reliability test governed the admissibility 
of hearsay for unavailable declarants.65 Under Roberts, a statement of an una-
vailable declarant was admissible at trial if it fell under one of the “firmly-
rooted hearsay exception[s],” ones that existed at common law, even if the 
declarant is unavailable at trial.66 One example of such an exception is a pre-
sent sense impression, which is “[a] statement describing or explaining an 
event or condition, made while or immediately after the declarant perceived 
it,” regardless of the availability of the declarant.67 Another firmly-rooted 
hearsay exception is an excited utterance, which is a statement made while 
the declarant was experiencing an event that led to stress or excitement.68 A 
third example is a statement that describes the declarant’s “then-existing men-
tal, emotional, or physical condition.”69 Finally, a statement “made for medi-
cal diagnosis or treatment” also qualifies as a firmly-rooted hearsay excep-
tion.70 According to Roberts, hearsay statements that fall within these afore-
                                                                                                                           
 63 See id. 
 64 See id. 
 65 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 60 (2004); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). 
 66 FED. R. EVID. 803 (delineating exceptions to the hearsay rule that would allow admissibil-
ity of out-of-court statements); Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60 (citing Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66).  
 67 FED. R. EVID. 803(1). The following statement is an example of a present sense impression 
if the declarant makes the statement while witnessing the event: “The man in the hat is running 
fast away from the police.” See id. 
 68 Id. at 803(2) (defining an “excited utterance” as “[a] statement relating to a startling event 
or condition, made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused”). The 
following statement is an example of an excited utterance if the declarant makes the statement 
while someone else is pointing a gun at the declarant: “He’s pointing a gun at me!” See id. 
 69 Id. at 803(3) (defining a “then-existing mental, emotional, or physical condition” hearsay 
exception as “a statement of the declarant’s then-existing state of mind (such as motive, intent, or 
plan) or emotional, sensory, or physical condition (such as mental feeling, pain, or bodily health), 
but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless 
it relates to the validity or terms of the declarant’s will”). The following statement is an example 
of a statement relating to the declarant’s then-existing mental, emotional, or physical condition if 
the declarant makes the statement while his or her vision is going blurry: “My vision is going 
blurry.” See id. 
 70 Id. at 803(4) (defining a “medical diagnosis or treatment” hearsay exception as “a statement 
that: (A) is made for—and is reasonably pertinent to—medical diagnosis or treatment; and (B) 
describes medical history; past or present symptoms or sensations; their inception; or their general 
cause”). The following statement is an example of a statement made for medical diagnosis or 
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mentioned exceptions are admissible at trial, regardless of the availability of 
the declarant, because these statements bear “adequate ‘indicia of reliabil-
ity.’”71 This is because statements falling under these exceptions are made in 
a context in which the declarant would not have the opportunity, incentive, 
need, or forethought to fabricate.72 
The Crawford Court ultimately found, however, that the discretion 
Roberts left to judges in determining the reliability of hearsay did not meet 
the intent of the Confrontation Clause.73 After Crawford, even if a statement 
falls under one of the aforementioned hearsay exceptions, the statement is 
not necessarily admissible at trial; under Crawford, the key for admissibility 
of an out-of-court statement is that it must be categorized as non-
testimonial.74 Crawford therefore implied that reliability alone is insuffi-
cient to determine the admissibility of hearsay. Instead, for the sake of pro-
tecting the Confrontation Clause, Crawford sets a higher bar that prosecu-
tors must meet for hearsay to be admitted when the declarant is unavailable 
by requiring a classification of “non-testimonial,” rather than merely requir-
ing the discretionary classification of reliable.75 In practice, for example, 
most courts hold that even if a declarant’s statement is deemed an excited 
                                                                                                                           
treatment if the declarant is speaking to his or her physician while being treated for an overdose: 
“I took drugs with my friends.” See id. 
 71 448 U.S. at 66. 
 72 See Carol A. Chase, Is Crawford a “Get Out of Jail Free” Card for Batterers and Abusers? 
An Argument for a Narrow Definition of “Testimonial,” 84 OR. L. REV. 1093, 1106–13 (2005) 
(discussing how hearsay exceptions are premised upon reliability because these contexts denote 
trustworthiness). A present sense impression is recognized as a hearsay exception because “the 
contemporaneity of the statement and the event” makes it unlikely that the declarant had time to 
develop the intent to fabricate. Id. Similarly, excited utterances preoccupy the brain so that there is 
no capacity to intentionally fabricate. Id. Medical diagnosis and treatment statements are also 
deemed reliable because declarants in those situations have a strong incentive to tell the truth. Id. 
Statements made by victims during 911 telephone calls, to medical personnel, or to first respond-
ers whom the victim talks to shortly after the event occurred would be admissible at trial even if 
the victim is unavailable for cross-examination because those statements fall under one of these 
exceptions. John M. Leventhal & Liberty Aldrich, The Admission of Evidence in Domestic Vio-
lence Cases After Crawford v. Washington: A National Survey, 11 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 77 
(2006) (citing United States v. James, 164 F. Supp. 2d 718 (D. Md. 2001); United States v. Haner, 
49 M.J. 72 (C.A.A.F. 1998); People v. Coleman, 791 N.Y.S.2d 112 (App. Div. 2005)). Many 
different situations qualify as a context in which the declarant would not want, need, or think to 
fabricate his or her statement(s). See, e.g., James, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 727–29 (admitting statements 
made to police officer by victim of domestic abuse as excited utterance); Haner, 49 M.J. at 76–77 
(admitting statements made by domestic violence victim to doctor via medical treatment hearsay 
exception); Coleman, 791 N.Y.S.2d at 113 (admitting recording of 911 telephone call made by a 
distraught person as either an excited utterance or present sense impression). 
 73 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004) (“Where testimonial statements are in-
volved, we do not think the Framers meant to leave the Sixth Amendment’s protection to the va-
garies of the rules of evidence . . . .”). 
 74 Id. at 68. 
 75 Id. at 50–52, 63, 68. 
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utterance, if that utterance is made in response to the police interrogation, 
rather than made during an ongoing emergency, it will not be admissible at 
trial if the declarant becomes unavailable.76 This is because responses to for-
mal or official police interrogations are generally considered testimonial.77 
Although Crawford does discredit Roberts for its breadth in admitting 
an unavailable declarant’s hearsay at trial, this is not to say that Roberts and 
Crawford are completely incongruent in what hearsay they deem admissi-
ble. For instance, 911 telephone calls and “excited utterances” made to re-
sponding police officers could still be classified as ongoing emergencies, 
thereby rendering them non-testimonial statements and admissible under 
both Roberts and Crawford.78 This is because such statements often are not 
made for an interrogatory purpose but rather for the purpose of seeking im-
mediate aid.79 Similarly, the medical records of declarants can be admissible 
at trial even if the declarants themselves are not available, so long as the 
medical record consists of statements made “for the purposes of medical 
diagnosis or treatment,” thereby rendering the statements non-testimonial.80 
In the situations where hearsay is considered non-testimonial, Crawford 
grants the flexibility and discretion to admit hearsay under the traditional 
hearsay exceptions rooted in reliability, which is quite reminiscent of the 
Roberts test.81  
E. Crawford and the Forfeiture by Wrongdoing Doctrine 
Despite criticizing Roberts for being too lenient and broad because it 
does not consider the testimonial aspect of an unavailable declarant’s state-
ment, Crawford still appreciated that the right to confrontation is not abso-
lute. The Crawford Court recognized how a defendant’s confrontation right 
can be extinguished through the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine.82 Even 
if a hearsay statement is classified as testimonial and the declarant is una-
vailable for cross-examination, the statement may still be admissible pursu-
                                                                                                                           
 76 Leventhal & Aldrich, supra note 72, at 87. 
 77 Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 828–29 (2006). 
 78 Leventhal & Aldrich, supra note 72, at 87–88. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. at 84, 92 (citing State v. Vaught, 682 N.W.2d 284 (Neb. 2004)); see, e.g., People v. 
Sisavath, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 757 (Ct. App. 2004) (holding that an unavailable sexual assault 
victim’s medical statements were not made for the purpose of seeking medical diagnosis or treat-
ment because they were made to a police officer as opposed to a doctor or a nurse and were thus 
inadmissible at trial); Snowden v. State, 846 A.2d 36, 47 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004) (holding 
statements made to a social worker were not made for the purpose of seeking medical diagnosis or 
treatment). 
 81 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 56, 68 (2004) (“Where nontestimonial hearsay is at 
issue”—for example, in business records or statements made in furtherance of a conspiracy—“the 
States [have] flexibility in their development of hearsay law . . . .”). 
 82 Id. at 62. 
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ant to the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine.83 Under this doctrine, if a de-
fendant’s own wrongdoing causes the declarant to be unavailable for cross-
examination, that defendant forfeits his or her right to confrontation and the 
unavailable declarant’s hearsay statement, even if testimonial, is admissible 
at trial.84 Examples of a “wrongdoing” committed by the defendant include 
coercing, killing, harming, bribing, or threatening the declarant in such a 
way that would make availability impossible or unappealing.85 The Su-
preme Court’s recognition of the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to the 
Confrontation Clause provides prosecutors with an avenue to admit hearsay 
that could otherwise be inadmissible under Crawford.86 The Court’s reason-
ing behind the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to Crawford is an equi-
table one: a person should not benefit from engaging in a wrongful act.87 In 
other words, without the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception, defendants 
could otherwise have an unfair advantage in the courtroom by preventing 
incriminating or crucial evidence from being admitted at trial by personally 
rendering the declarant unavailable. 
In 2008 in Giles v. California, a lethal domestic violence case, the Su-
preme Court limited the applicability of the forfeiture by wrongdoing doc-
trine by holding that, in order for the exception to apply, the prosecutor 
must prove that the defendant intentionally procured the declarant’s una-
vailability to testify.88 The Giles majority specified that in cases of domestic 
                                                                                                                           
 83 Id. 
 84 FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6) (codifying the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine); Davis v. Wash-
ington, 547 U.S. 813, 833 (2006) (reiterating Crawford’s acceptance of the forfeiture by wrongdo-
ing doctrine); Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62 (“the rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing (which we accept) 
extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially equitable grounds”). 
 85 See James F. Flanagan, Confrontation, Equity, and the Misnamed Exception for Forfeiture 
by Wrongdoing, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RIGHTS. J. 1193, 1220 (2006) (explaining that post-
Crawford, some courts, such as People v. Moore, 117 P.3d 1 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005), did not re-
quire the defendant to have intentionally prevented declarant’s availability for the forfeiture by 
wrongdoing hearsay exception to apply). Contra Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 359–65, 368 
(2008) (holding forfeiture by wrongdoing hearsay exception did not apply to defendant who mur-
dered girlfriend because he did not murder her for the purpose of preventing her from testifying 
against him). 
 86 See Flanagan, supra note 85, at 1214 (explaining in most state and federal courts, the pros-
ecution must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that declarant’s absence was procured by 
wrongdoing of the defendant for exception to be applicable); see also United States v. Stewart, 
485 F.3d 666, 672 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine makes an una-
vailable witness’s hearsay admissible at trial, even if the defendant was trying to procure the una-
vailability for a different trial); People v. Jones, 714 N.W.2d 362, 367–68 (Mich. Ct. App. 2006) 
(holding the right guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause is no longer applicable to a defendant 
who procures a declarant’s unavailability through an act of wrongdoing). 
 87 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62; United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 272 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 88 554 U.S. at 357, 368, 377 (vacating and remanding decision of California Supreme Court 
admitting murder victim’s testimonial hearsay under the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to 
Crawford because defendant did not murder the victim with intent or purpose of making her una-
vailable for trial). 
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violence, a demonstrated history or pattern of abuse or control by the de-
fendant over the declarant is “highly relevant to [the] inquiry” of intent.89 
The concurring opinion in Giles pushed further, stating that such evidence 
is sufficient to infer intent.90 This is because manipulation and control—
conscious and intentional acts—necessarily accompany relationships of 
domestic violence.91 Because the Giles holding allows testimonial hearsay 
of an unavailable declarant to be admitted at trial if the unavailability was 
intentionally and wrongfully caused by the defendant, the holding thereby 
offers a potential avenue of relief from the added pressure placed on prose-
cutors by Crawford’s more stringent requirement of availability. 
F. The Primary Critique of Crawford 
Since Crawford was decided in 2004, it has been heavily criticized, 
particularly for the confusion it has created amongst lower courts. The pri-
mary critique of Crawford is that it produces inconsistent jurisprudence due 
to its lack of precise language defining whether a statement is testimonial—
the essential and decisive determination in the application of Crawford.92 
This shortfall leaves courts susceptible to “judicial manipulation” and ulti-
mately leads to discrepancy amongst court holdings.93 Even in light of Da-
vis’ primary purpose analysis for determining what constitutes an ongoing 
emergency and accordingly, what is considered non-testimonial, critics claim 
that there are no objective and definitive guidelines underlying the Davis 
test.94 Thus, as a result, the Davis test similarly confuses lower courts.95 In-
deed, because of Crawford and Davis’ failure to define crucial terminology, 
there has already been great variation in the factors lower courts look to 
when interpreting what kinds of statements are testimonial, and therefore 
                                                                                                                           
 89 Id. at 377. 
 90 See Id. at 379–80 (Souter, J., concurring in part) (explaining intent to procure declarant’s 
unavailability can be inferred in a domestic violence case because isolation and silencing through 
physical, verbal, psychological, and/or emotional abuse and control define such relationships). 
 91 See id. 
 92 Deborah Ahrens & John Mitchell, Don’t Blame Crawford or Bryant: The Confrontation 
Clause Mess Is All Davis’ Fault, 39 RUTGERS L. REC. 104, 107–12 (2012) (discussing the “mess” 
and inconsistency of Confrontation Clause jurisprudence). 
 93 Id. at 107. 
 94 See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 839–42 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (discuss-
ing the subjectivity of the Davis test); Ahrens & Mitchell, supra note 92, at 107. 
 95 See Ahrens & Mitchell, supra note 92, at 109–13; see also State v. Rodriguez, 722 N.W.2d 
136, 141 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006) (discussing that Davis has led to inconsistent definitions of “ongo-
ing emergency”); Leventhal & Aldrich, supra note 72, at 85–86 (noting many questions remain 
unresolved after Davis); Meier, supra note 2, at 26 (discussing the confusion and varying interpre-
tations of testimonial following the Davis decision). 
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inadmissible pursuant to Crawford.96 Because those factors change in near-
ly every opinion, courts across the nation have been inconsistent in their 
jurisprudence, thereby setting the stage for an unpredictable future in Craw-
ford-based rulings. 
In 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court again attempted to clarify the distinc-
tion between testimonial and non-testimonial out-of-court statements in 
Michigan v. Bryant.97 This case is particularly relevant because it focuses 
on defining testimonial specifically in the context of an ongoing emergency, 
the context most often present in rape and domestic violence cases.98 In 
Bryant, police arrived at the scene of a shooting where the victim, prior to 
her death, responded to police questioning regarding the identification and 
location of his shooter.99 The Supreme Court applied Davis’ primary pur-
pose test to determine the testimonial or non-testimonial nature of the hear-
say statement.100 In doing so, the Bryant court analyzed the intent, circum-
stances, and safety of both the declarant and the interrogators.101 In its anal-
ysis, the court made various subjective determinations, such as whether the 
statement occurred in a public area, whether the interrogation was informal 
                                                                                                                           
 96 Deborah Tuerkheimer, Forfeiture After Giles: The Relevance of “Domestic Violence Con-
text,” 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 711, 711–15, 728 (2009) (“Lower courts have struggled with 
the new ‘ongoing emergency’ test.”); see Rodriguez, 722 N.W.2d at 141 (finding despite victim 
being separated from her attacker and questioned at her home, statements were not testimonial 
because attacker was hiding under the couch with a weapon). Compare United States v. Arnold, 
486 F.3d 177, 179–80 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding a victim’s statements describing a gun to the first 
responder to be non-testimonial because the primary purpose of her statements was to respond the 
police questions being asked in order to manage the ongoing emergency), and State v. Pugh, 225 
P.3d 892, 895–96 (Wash. 2009) (finding entire 911 telephone call was non-testimonial because it 
passed a four-part test analyzing: 1) when the events being described occurred; 2) whether there 
was an ongoing emergency; 3) whether the statements were immediately necessary to resolve the 
current ongoing emergency; and 4) the formality of the interrogation), with Rankins v. Common-
wealth, 237 S.W.3d 128, 128 (Ky. 2007) (finding statements made to first responder were testi-
monial although made mere minutes after emergency ended), and State v. Camarena, 176 P.3d 
380, 386–88 (Or. 2008) (finding at least part of 911 telephone call was testimonial because its 
purpose was to identify the defendant for trial). 
 97 562 U.S. 344, 352 (2011). 
 98 See id. at 359; see also Chase, supra note 72, at 1106–15 (discussing how the attributes of 
assault cases necessarily signify the attributes that create a context for an ongoing emergency); 
Leventhal & Aldrich, supra note 72, at 85–88 (discussing the responsiveness required by govern-
ment officials in domestic violence cases); Meier, supra note 2, at 26 (discussing the interaction of 
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 56 (2004), and domestic violence contexts). Bryant applies a 
broad scope as to what qualifies as an ongoing emergency. See 562 U.S. at 359. This expansive 
view patently allows rape and domestic violence cases, which by definition involve an injury, 
whether psychological, physical, or emotional, to fall under the definition of ongoing emergency 
not only because an injury is involved, but also because by definition, these cases require urgency 
to diffuse the harm caused. 
 99 See Bryant, 562 U.S. at 359; Ahrens & Mitchell, supra note 92, at 104, 108 (citing Bryant, 
562 U.S. at 349–50). 
 100 Bryant, 562 U.S. at 366–69. 
 101 Id. 
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rather than a formal interview, whether the dangerous weapon was still at 
large, whether there was an ongoing threat to public safety, and whether the 
statement was reliable.102 In applying these factors, the Court held that the 
police interrogation was an informal line of questioning that occurred in a 
public area, there was a dangerous weapon still at large that created an on-
going threat to public safety, and the victim’s statements were reliable be-
cause they were not only excited utterances, but they were also made during 
an ongoing emergency, which has the “effect of focusing an individual’s 
attention on responding to the emergency.”103 Bryant’s multi-factor analysis 
reintroduces consideration of reliability for purposes of determining wheth-
er a statement is testimonial specifically in the context of an ongoing emer-
gency, as is the case with domestic violence and rape cases. With this analy-
sis, the Court found the victim’s statements to be non-testimonial in nature, 
and thereby admissible at trial.104 
In attempting to delineate the factors to consider when evaluating 
whether a statement is testimonial, Bryant created even more space for judi-
cial discretion under a Crawford determination. The Court urged that the 
totality of the circumstances be considered in this type of analysis because it 
did not believe a blanket rule or an exhaustive list of factors could defini-
tively evaluate the testimonial or non-testimonial nature of a statement in all 
cases.105 The Bryant Court emphasized the importance of leaving room for 
broad discretion in stating, “[c]ourts making a ‘primary purpose’ assessment 
should not be unjustifiably restrained from consulting all relevant [evi-
dence],” but rather, should use a highly context-dependent inquiry.106 Ulti-
mately, although it attempted to delineate new factors with which to analyze 
a Crawford situation, the Bryant Court chose to remain consistent with prior 
holdings in promoting inconsistency. Bryant furthered the lack of a coher-
ent principled basis for determining what constitutes a testimonial statement 
in the context of an emergency, such as a rape or domestic violence, and in 
doing so, validated precedent that allows for subjectivity and discrepancy 
amongst court rulings.107 
                                                                                                                           
 102 Id. at 369, 371–77 (holding factors, such as formality of questioning, timing of the state-
ments, and condition of the declarant, can be considered when determining whether statements 
were made during an ongoing emergency). 
 103 Id. at 362. 
 104 Id. at 377–78. 
 105 See id. at 369–70. 
 106 Id. at 369–71, 374–75; Ahrens & Mitchell, supra note 92, at 108 n.30 (citing Bryant, 562 
U.S. at 369–71). 
 107 See Ahrens & Mitchell, supra note 92, at 108; see also Leventhal & Aldrich, supra note 
72, at 85–86 (noting many questions remain unresolved after Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 
(2006)); Meier, supra note 2, at 26. 
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Similar to Roberts, Bryant also takes a compromising approach to the 
Confrontation Clause in that it affords courts the discretion to make a case-
by-case determination regarding whether a hearsay statement is testimonial 
based on subjective factors.108 Taking note of this, Justice Scalia’s dissent in 
Bryant argues that the Court’s decision undermines the Confrontation Clause 
by reinserting reliability into a Crawford assessment.109 Justice Scalia’s crit-
icism echoes that of many scholars and judges, including Supreme Court 
Justice Thomas.110 These opponents claim that the Bryant ruling returns 
courts to the initial problem posed by the “reliability” test in Roberts—that 
the right to confrontation is again easily “manipulable” by courts’ subjective 
determinations.111 Opponents also criticize Bryant’s reliance on discretion-
ary factors by arguing that the factors can be easily manipulated due to their 
dependence on the subjective perception of the declarant’s audience, the 
police on the scene, and the presiding judge at trial.112 This claim mirrors 
Justice Thomas’ criticism of the primary purpose discussed back in the Da-
vis opinion.113 When concurring in part and dissenting in part in the Davis 
opinion, Justice Thomas argued that the intentions of first responders are 
subjective, and that courts should not take it upon themselves to “guess” 
what those intentions were at the time the declarant’s statement was 
made.114 In their criticisms, Justices Scalia and Thomas and various schol-
ars warn that Bryant curtails defendants’ confrontation rights and ad-
vantages prosecutorial power.  
Lower courts’ inability to consistently interpret Supreme Court decisions 
on the Confrontation Clause and inability to apply a coherent principle as to 
what constitutes a testimonial statement is further complicated by the difficul-
ty in assessing law enforcement’s primary duty at a certain time.115 When 
responding to a dispatch call, law enforcement personnel themselves are un-
certain of which of their many purposes they are serving; they arrive bear-
                                                                                                                           
 108 See Robert P. Mosteller, Confrontation as Constitutional Criminal Procedure: Crawford’s 
Birth Did Not Require that Roberts Had to Die, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 685, 695–96 (2007). 
 109 Bryant, 562 U.S. at 388 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (claiming that the Bryant holding has “dis-
tort[ed] our Confrontation Clause jurisprudence and leaves it in [] shambles”). 
 110 Davis, 547 U.S. at 839–42 (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); 
Marc Chase McAllister, Evading Confrontation: From One Amorphous Standard to Another, 35 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 473, 479 (2012) (claiming that “Bryant, the Court’s most recent decision in 
this area, has fully revived the flaws of Roberts”). 
 111 See McAllister, supra note 110, at 491 (discussing the malleability of the factors used in 
the Bryant analysis). 
 112 See id. 
 113 547 U.S. at 834–42. 
 114 Id. (disagreeing with the majority that the declarant in Hammon was out of danger despite 
her saying she was “fine”). 
 115 Meier, supra note 2, at 25; see Adam M. Gershowitz & Laura R. Killinger, The State 
(Never) Rests: How Excessive Prosecutorial Caseloads Harm Criminal Defendants, 105 NW. L. 
REV. 261, 270 (2011). 
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ing a vast range of responsibilities, most of which they assume simultane-
ously, including securing a scene, ensuring safety, investigating the crime 
and assessing the likelihood of prosecution.116 Given this array of purposes 
law enforcement can be serving at any one time, the process of delineating a 
“primary” purpose becomes convoluted. Additionally, some critics claim 
that in evaluating an emergency, courts should not focus solely on the de-
clarant’s emergency, but should also take into consideration the level of the 
emergency, meaning the sense of urgency with which law enforcement per-
sonnel conduct their information-gathering practices for the purpose of se-
curing safety and serving justice.117 These critics reason that such an analy-
sis will help shed light on the “ongoing” aspect of an ongoing emergency, 
because a greater sense of urgency is indicative of a presently occurring 
sense of danger.118 Developing a consistent and objective test that adequate-
ly evaluates the full context of an emergency, however, has proven to be a 
difficult task for courts given the range of law enforcement personnel’s 
overlapping responsibilities and the many actors at play. 
Although Crawford by itself does not reassert reliability when imple-
menting the Confrontation Clause, Bryant’s analysis and application of 
Crawford does indeed consider reliability in the context of ongoing emer-
gencies.119 Therefore, in evaluating a hearsay statement made during an 
ongoing emergency, as in domestic violence and rape cases, then through 
Bryant’s understanding of Crawford, a court can once again consider relia-
bility as an element in determining admissibility.120 This ultimately gener-
ates yet another complex phenomenon. Following Bryant, prosecutors nei-
ther have consistent jurisprudence to rely on for arguing hearsay to be con-
sidered non-testimonial, nor do they have the same extent of flexibility that 
was once bestowed upon them by Roberts’ broad and sole requirement of 
reliability. In effect, Crawford strengthens a defendant’s confrontation right 
while at the same time sacrifices the admissibility of potentially incriminat-
ing statements, but Bryant only compounds the problem because in deline-
ating its testimonial factors, it leaves courts with too much discretion to 
provide any guarantees for unavailable declarants. Inevitably, Crawford and 
its progeny make the prosecution of defendants much more difficult when 
declarants are unavailable for cross-examination. 
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The subjective tests delineated in post-Crawford decisions, including 
Bryant, pose an especially significant danger in the context of domestic vio-
lence and rape cases where these victims are frequently unavailable to testi-
fy at trial.121 This is because domestic violence and rape victims are driven 
to recant, drop charges, or simply choose not to appear, whether it be out of 
fear of facing their abuser, the economic consequences of breaking relations 
with their abuser, divulging personal information in a public courtroom, or 
out of rekindled affection for the abuser.122 When this occurs and the victim 
is unwilling to cooperate, prosecutors are left to rely on hearsay and its 
questionable admissibility under the unstable device of Crawford and its 
application in Bryant. Given how discretionary the Bryant application is, 
prosecutors in domestic violence and rape cases are posed with an unpre-
dictable trial where their most crucial piece of evidence may not be admit-
ted simply based on a subjective decision by the court. 
Furthermore, the victims in these cases are particularly vulnerable. 
Domestic violence cases, like most rape cases, are delicate in nature in that 
the victim and the assailant have a personal relationship, thereby making it 
difficult for the victim to be available for cross-examination by the de-
fense.123 The domestic violence and rape victims have already suffered 
physically, emotionally, and psychologically, but now bear a difficult bur-
den to seek justice for their suffering. If the victim is unavailable for cross- 
examination, it is highly unlikely that his or her statements will be admissi-
ble in court given the difficulty Crawford and its progeny place on prosecut-
ing with an unavailable declarant, and therefore highly unlikely that the at-
tacker will be convicted. Ultimately, these victims are forced to choose be-
tween testifying and confronting their attacker or facing the probability that 
their attacker may not be incarcerated. These victims are essentially re-
victimized regardless of the choice they make because Crawford asks them 
to either re-live their trauma in a public trial or be responsible for making 
prosecution of their attacker much more difficult. If, as a result of the victim 
declarant’s unavailability and the consequential inadmissibility of crucial 
evidence, the victim’s attacker escapes conviction and attacks again, then 
                                                                                                                           
 121 See id. at 371–77; see also Chase, supra note 72, at 1093, 1095 (discussing the implica-
tions of Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 56 (2004), particularly in domestic violence and other 
abuse cases because victims in such cases frequently become unavailable). 
 122 Chase, supra note 72, at 1112–13; Geetanjli Malhotra, Note, Resolving the Ambiguity 
Behind the Bright Line Rule: The Effect of Crawford v. Washington on the Admissibility of 911 
Calls in Evidence-Based Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 205, 213–14 (ex-
plaining that despite prosecutor, not domestic violence victim, deciding whether the case proceeds 
or is dropped, recanting and fear still create problems for prosecutors). 
 123 Chase, supra note 72, at 1118; see Meier, supra note 2, at 23; Jane K. Stoever, Transform-
ing Domestic Violence Representation, 101 KY. L.J. 483, 488 (2012–2013) (citing LENORE E. 
WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 95–97 (1984)). 
22 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 37:1 
the victim is even further traumatized because Crawford places the weight 
of that guilt on their shoulders. 
II. CRAWFORD’S APPLICATION TO THE UNIQUE CONTEXT  
OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES 
As a result of Crawford v. Washington, cases in which prosecutors rely 
primarily on hearsay or on forensic evidence, which is a form of hearsay in 
the sense that it requires the presence of the person who conducted the fo-
rensic analysis at trial, rather than on the live testimony of a victim or wit-
ness, have become increasingly difficult.124 Not surprisingly, this is due to 
the requirement that hearsay statements qualify as non-testimonial and in-
consistent jurisprudence surrounding that determination. These obstacles 
prevent evidence-based or victimless prosecutions from admitting what is 
often the defining and most crucial piece of evidence against the defendant: 
the unavailable victim’s testimonial hearsay.125 Consequently, defendants in 
such cases are often not convicted due to insufficient substantial evidence. 
Domestic violence cases are frequently victimless, and are particularly sub-
ject to Crawford’s downfalls for the following reasons: the high probability 
that the domestic violence victim will be unavailable at trial, the intent of 
the Confrontation Clause as applied to domestic violence cases, and the im-
pact of Crawford on domestic violence prosecutions. 
A. The Unavailability of Domestic Violence Victims 
Domestic violence victims are frequently unavailable for cross-
examination, which poses difficulties for prosecutors at trial in attempting 
to convict attackers. Victims of domestic violence are particularly suscepti-
ble to recanting their testimonial hearsay or becoming unavailable for cross-
examination for two reasons: (1) the abuser exercises control over the vic-
tim by using intimidation, coercion (including economic coercion), psycho-
logical pain, or physical violence to scare or guilt the victim from appearing 
at a trial proceeding, or (2) the volatile and cyclical nature of a domestic 
violence relationship makes it possible that the victim has succumbed to the 
honeymoon phase of the cycle of violence, which involves feelings of love, 
self-blame, and forgiveness, and thus regrets ever having made any impli-
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cating statements.126 As a result, eighty to ninety percent of domestic vio-
lence victims recant or refuse to cooperate with prosecution.127  
Because domestic violence victims are so frequently reluctant or unco-
operative and fail to provide live testimony, prosecutors are forced to pro-
ceed with victimless or evidence-based prosecutions. In turn, the admissi-
bility of statements made by unavailable victims becomes crucial in the 
outcome of the case.128 Without the live testimony of the victim, prosecu-
tors are left with the victim’s hearsay as the most significant evidence in 
obtaining a conviction against the defendant. Reliance on hearsay evidence 
is common in domestic violence cases due to the high volume of victims in 
those cases who are unavailable for cross-examination. Such reliance, how-
ever, is tenuous at best given the subjective and discretionary application of 
Crawford.129 In other words, because domestic violence cases often turn on 
the admissibility of hearsay statements, these cases become “particularly 
susceptible to the negative consequences” of Crawford.130 
Because victims of domestic violence are often unavailable for cross-
examination due to the power and control exerted over them by their abuser 
and the cyclical nature of domestic violence, courts are tasked with charac-
terizing victims’ hearsay statements as testimonial or not pursuant to the 
unpredictable line of precedent set forth by Crawford.131 In turn, prosecu-
tors run a high risk of not being able to admit crucial evidence at trial. Do-
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mestic violence cases require a Crawford analysis due to the nature of the 
statements that victims make. For example, domestic violence victims 
commonly make instinctive emergency telephone calls to law enforcement 
personnel in hopes of being saved from the violence they are experienc-
ing.132 Then, over the telephone or in-person to whomever responds, the 
victim makes a statement implicating his or her abuser in the violence.133 
Such a statement will typically satisfy a hearsay exception as a present 
sense impression, excited utterance, or statement made to medical person-
nel.134 However, a court must then analyze whether the statement is testi-
monial in nature in the likely event that the victim later recants his or her 
testimonial statement or becomes unavailable.135 Given the inconsistency in 
what qualifies as testimonial under Crawford and its progeny, the statement 
could be inadmissible.136 Subsequently, if neither the live testimony nor the 
hearsay statement of the victim is available at trial, prosecutors are left with 
few options for presenting strong and incriminating evidence. 
B. The Intent of the Confrontation Clause and the Sixth Amendment As 
Applied to Domestic Violence Cases 
The intent of the Confrontation Clause at the time of its enactment in 
1791 is particularly troubling today. The Confrontation Clause’s historical 
background conveys that its original intent is inappropriate in the context of 
domestic violence prosecutions due to its underlying assumptions about 
men and women in society.137 The Confrontation Clause was enacted at a 
time in which society was accepting, and even encouraging, of domestic 
violence in an effort to uphold the authoritative position of men and perpet-
uate the status of women as subordinate.138 In fact, some of the early sup-
porters of the Confrontation Clause overtly endorsed domestic violence as a 
                                                                                                                           
 132 See, e.g., United States v. James, 164 F. Supp. 2d 718, 727–29 (D. Md. 2001) (holding a 
woman’s 911 telephone call after she had just been pushed and slapped by her husband was ad-
missible as an excited utterance); State v. McCombs, 2000 WL 1836338, at *1–3 (Ohio Ct. App. 
Dec. 14, 2000) (holding statements made by victim of domestic violence to 911 operator, neigh-
bor, and responding patrolman could be admitted at trial as excited utterances because her state-
ments were reactive and not a product of reflective thinking). 
 133 See James, 164 F. Supp. at 727–29; McCombs, 2000 WL 1836338 at *1–3. 
 134 See FED. R. EVID. 803(1–3). 
 135 See id.; Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54–68. 
 136 See Leventhal & Aldrich, supra note 72, at 85–86; Meier, supra note 2, at 26. 
 137 Moody, supra note 10, at 389 n.15 (citing Prentice L. White, Stopping the Chronic Batter-
er Through Legislation: Will It Work This Time?, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 709, 715–16 (2004)). 
 138 Id. (“By intentionally limiting the understanding of the meaning of the Confrontation 
Clause to a time when women were treated as chattel and men abused their wives with impunity, 
constitutional law jurisprudence will, perhaps unwittingly, prevent a shift toward successful pros-
ecution of this conduct.”). 
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way to ensure that men could take any measure, including violent ones, 
against their wives without impunity to maintain their patriarchal role.139  
Although society has since progressed beyond this male-dominated re-
gime, in effect the Confrontation Clause unfortunately operates in a way 
that does subordinate domestic violence victims, who are most often wom-
en, by leaving them with very little protection. At its core, the Confrontation 
Clause was intended to protect defendants who are not able to confront their 
accusers face-to-face.140 Although it is important that the Sixth Amendment 
to the U.S. Constitution recognizes a defendant’s confrontation right, it is 
also important to recognize the conundrum that in domestic violence cases, 
it is often the defendant who actually prevents his or her accuser from being 
available at trial.141 There are a myriad of reasons why a domestic violence 
victim chooses to be unavailable at trial, including being afraid to re-face past 
abuse, being too intimidated to testify at trial, experiencing overt threats from 
the defendant, fearing the economic hardship that could accompany break-
ing ties with the abuser, being vulnerable to questioning on highly personal 
and sensitive topics, or feeling too guilty to testify against the defendant.142 
Regardless of the particular reason, they all render the declarant unavaila-
ble.143  
 This dynamic turns “the original paradigm for which the Confrontation 
Clause was designed . . . on its head” because the Clause’s fundamental ob-
jective is to protect a defendant from being convicted based on the words of 
someone who isn’t even present at the defendant’s trial.144 However, in its 
effort to protect defendants, the Confrontation Clause, exacerbated by the 
hearsay rules of evidence, creates a loophole through which defendants can 
essentially increase their own likelihood of success at trial by manipulating 
the Sixth Amendment in a way whereby the defendant’s right to confront 
trumps the victim-declarant’s psychological considerations. Ultimately, the 
defendant is the element constant among the many reasons why a domestic 
violence victim does not testify at trial, yet it is the victim and the prosecution 
who likely lose because of the victim’s unavailability. Therefore, in domestic 
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violence cases, it is not the defendant’s right to confrontation that needs pro-
tection, especially because that right is safeguarded in many ways, including 
by the Sixth Amendment and hearsay rules.145 Instead, it is the prosecution’s 
right to present material evidence by a victim-declarant who has valid psy-
chological reasons for being unavailable that needs protection.146 
C. Crawford’s Barrier to Successful Domestic Violence Prosecutions 
The Crawford ruling not only presents potential problems for domestic 
violence victims during trial by requiring a victim to confront his or her at-
tacker, but it can also prevent domestic violence cases from ever reaching 
trial altogether. The frequent unavailability of domestic violence victims, in 
conjunction with the inconsistent line of precedent on defining testimonial 
hearsay statements following Crawford, threatens and deters prosecutors 
from moving forward in domestic violence cases.147 
Most prosecutors believe that the Crawford decision has “significantly 
impeded prosecutions of domestic violence” cases by discouraging prosecu-
tors from pursuing cases where the victim is unavailable because of the dif-
ficulty in admitting the out-of-court statements that victims make, the es-
sential evidence, at trial.148 This difficulty is foreseeable and known to 
many prosecutors given how often, albeit inconsistently, hearsay in domes-
tic violence cases is considered testimonial, and thus is not admissible at 
trial per Crawford.149 As a result, prosecutors pursue charges against a de-
fendant for a case they believe is destined to fail, but often subsequently 
drop those charges. In fact, seventy-six percent of prosecutors surveyed in 
California, Oregon, and Washington stated that they would drop a case if 
the victim recanted or was uncooperative in testifying.150 This is because 
when prosecutors foresee the unlikelihood of success without an available 
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victim-declarant, it becomes precarious for them to rely on a crucial piece 
of evidence that has a foreseeable chance of being inadmissible given in-
consistent, and oftentimes conflicting, jurisprudence.151 
Crawford not only disincentives prosecutors from pursuing domestic 
violence cases when the victim is unwilling to testify, but it also disincen-
tives police officers from moving forward with these types of cases, too.152 
This is particularly significant because before a prosecutor even has the op-
portunity to decide whether to pursue a domestic violence case, police of-
ficers first determine whether there is probable cause for an arrest warrant 
and document their findings in a report directed to the prosecutor’s office.153 
Subsequently, the prosecutor’s office analyzes the report and makes a de-
termination on whether to proceed in pressing charges against the accused 
based on the likelihood of success at trial.154 Under Crawford, if the police 
determine that the victim is unwilling to cooperate or be available for cross-
examination, it is unlikely that police will refer the case to the prosecutor’s 
office because they believe it will not succeed at trial without the testimoni-
al hearsay as admissible evidence.155 
Despite the high volume of domestic violence incidents reported—up 
to fifty percent of calls to police and up to twenty to fifty percent of crimi-
nal dockets involve domestic violence cases—police officers and prosecu-
tors are still reluctant to go forth with such cases after Crawford due to their 
unlikelihood of success.156 Although victims of domestic violence have a 
right to seek justice against their perpetrators for both legal and psychologi-
cal reasons, perpetrators are frequently not charged, let alone convicted, and 
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are therefore free to continue their violence.157 Ultimately, the barrier creat-
ed by Crawford and the resulting reluctance of police officers and prosecu-
tors to pursue domestic violence cases leave many victims continually vic-
timized and allow many abusers to continue to abuse not only their current 
victims, but also new victims.158 In contrast, if a perpetrator of domestic 
violence discovers that police officers and prosecutors intend to pursue their 
case, then they are more likely to stop the abuse against their victims, more 
likely to plead guilty to the charge, and less likely to abuse future victims.159 
A prosecutor proceeding with a domestic violence case in which the 
victim is unavailable has two hopes for a substantial chance of success at 
trial under Crawford: (1) the victim’s statement will not be considered tes-
timonial, and thus it can be admissible via a hearsay exception or withstand 
Ohio v. Roberts’ reliability test, or (2) the forfeiture by wrongdoing excep-
tion will be applicable and render the statement admissible.160 Beyond these 
two avenues for potentially admitting hearsay statements in the domestic 
violence context, a prosecutor’s probability of success at trial significantly 
decreases because the valuable testimonial hearsay evidence would not be 
admissible under Crawford.161 If there is no forensic evidence, the hearsay 
is not just valuable, but it is critical for a conviction because any other type 
of evidence would be circumstantial at best, which is far weaker evidence 
than the very direct evidence of concrete statements made by the victim-
declarant because it relies on inference.162 
Although each of the two possible aforementioned methods for admit-
ting an unavailable declarant’s hearsay at trial are beneficial in theory, both 
are often unattainable for several reasons. Despite the fact that a determina-
tion regarding whether hearsay is testimonial is made on a case-by-case ba-
sis, courts frequently find domestic violence victims’ out-of-court state-
ments are testimonial statements made during an ongoing emergency.163 
The circumstances that often surround cases of domestic violence, including 
control through threats or acts of violence, often prevent the victim from 
making a call to police during an actual incident of violence for fear of fur-
ther violence from his or her attacker.164 Instead, the victim must wait until 
the abuser is no longer present to have a private telephone conversation. As 
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a result of this phenomenon, law enforcement officers who respond to do-
mestic violence calls are often doing so for the purpose of investigating the 
events that have already occurred, not ones that are presently occurring.165 
Unlike the out-of-court statements involved in Davis v. Washington and 
Michigan v. Bryant, under a Crawford analysis, these particular facts are 
akin to those in Hammon v. Indiana, and thereby render the victim’s state-
ments testimonial because they were gathered for the purpose of potential 
future use at trial, not for responding to an emergency or a threat to public 
safety.166 
Furthermore, courts often conclude that the presence of a law en-
forcement officer primarily serves an investigative purpose. Even in cases 
where officers must physically restrain the defendant from harming the vic-
tim-declarant, courts have still deemed the declarant’s statements testimoni-
al in nature rather than falling under the ongoing emergency exception.167 
Judicial failure to recognize that a law enforcement officer seeks infor-
mation also for the purpose of protection and failure to expand the current 
stringent view on what constitutes an ongoing emergency is detrimental to 
the prosecution of domestic violence cases where the victim is unavaila-
ble.168 This is because victimless prosecutions rely on evidence in place of 
live testimony.169 The critical evidence relied upon to prosecute these 
crimes, however, is often not admissible at trial. Many victims’ statements 
are deemed testimonial despite an obvious primary need for protection ra-
ther than investigation and despite the fact that a domestic violence rela-
tionship, by definition, is in and of itself an ongoing emergency for the en-
tire duration that the relationship is in existence.170 
Relying on the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception is also problematic 
for prosecutors because in order to apply the doctrine, a prosecutor must 
prove, by a preponderance of evidence, that the defendant intentionally pro-
cured a declarant’s unavailability, which is not an easy task.171 Although the 
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Giles v. California court stated that a pattern of abuse could be sufficient in 
proving the intentional procurement of the declarant’s unavailability, the 
court failed to consider that in reality, the abuse in domestic violence rela-
tionships is often well-hidden by long-lasting periods of the honeymoon 
phase.172 The honeymoon phase occurs after an incident of abuse in which 
the abuser attempts to reconcile with the victim through various means, such 
as gifts or apologies, in an effort to convince the victim that the abuse will not 
happen again.173 These periods of reconciliation and “peace” are themselves a 
means of control and manipulation; they instill a sense of false hope in the 
victim that their abuser may actually change, thereby making the victim 
reluctant to testify against their abuser.174 By failing to recognize that these 
seemingly peaceful phases are part of the pattern of abuse and manipulation 
that allows abusers to control their victims, courts have been reluctant to 
admit the testimonial out-of-court statements made by unavailable domestic 
violence victims despite the Giles holding. Evidently, Crawford has gener-
ated serious impediments to prosecuting these sensitive, deplorable crimes. 
III. CRAWFORD’S APPLICATION TO RAPE CASES  
 Although many scholarly articles discuss Crawford v. Washington’s 
interaction with domestic violence cases, Crawford’s interaction with rape 
cases has received little scholarly documentation. This is because neither 
Crawford nor its progeny draw a distinction between these two types of 
cases. Perhaps this is because domestic violence and rape are both similarly 
defined as acts of violence and, as a result, courts do not feel compelled to 
evaluate rape independently when it can fall under the umbrella of domestic 
violence.175 In reality, Crawford’s identical treatment of rape and domestic 
violence is flawed because rape cases face their own, distinctive set of issues, 
and thereby require their own distinct analysis. The inherent differences be-
tween rape cases and domestic violence cases highlight the importance of 
assessing rape in the context of Crawford separately from domestic vio-
lence. Unfortunately, however, the essential role of hearsay in both domes-
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tic violence and rape cases means that the ultimate resulting detriment of 
Crawford in both types of cases is the same: the increased difficulty in ob-
taining a conviction due to the inadmissibility of probative evidence.  
A. Distinguishing Rape from Domestic Violence 
Rape can be distinguished from domestic violence in three primary 
ways: (1) through varying definitions, (2) through varying judicial process-
es, and (3) through varying psychological components. Although rape can 
be defined as falling under the umbrella of domestic violence, it does not 
always. Perpetrators of domestic violence are always intimate partners or 
family members, but perpetrators of rape do not have to be; they can be 
strangers or mere acquaintances.176 Additionally, although domestic vio-
lence is defined as involving an ongoing or cyclical relationship, the occur-
rence of a single incident is sufficient to constitute rape.177 Furthermore, 
some of the defining attributes that accompany domestic violence do not 
accompany rape, and vice versa.178 For instance, there is an aspect of vul-
nerability and mistrust that a rape victim feels as a result of sexual violence 
that may not necessarily, at least to the same extent, develop from domestic 
violence.179 Evidently, rape can be its own distinct form of violence, sepa-
rate and apart from instances of domestic violence. 
In addition to these definitional differences, there are also differences 
in the judicial process as applied to rape and domestic violence cases. One 
difference is that the justice system is more distrusting of rape victims’ ac-
cusations than they are of domestic violence victims’ accusations.180 This 
distrust is a historical one, dating back to times of slavery where “white 
women ‘were often pressured by white men to falsely accuse black men of 
rape[’].”181 Additionally, even in modern day, “high-profile stories of false 
rape accusations” garner greater attention and “capture [the public’s] collec-
tive imagination” more so than the more frequent truthful rape accusations, 
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which reinforces the belief that women falsely accuse men of rape.182 A 
sense of distrust of rape victims also stems from the fact that their demeanor 
often parallels the demeanor of a witness who lacks credibility.183 This is 
because their hesitation and reluctance to cooperate with police and prose-
cutors is perceived as being caused by fear of getting caught in a lie when, 
in reality, it is caused by fear of judgment, facing their perpetrators, and 
confronting their psychological damage.184 
Courts also apply another layer of evidence rules to rape cases that are 
not applicable to domestic violence cases.185 As discussed further below, 
these rules of evidence, known as rape shield laws, provide rape victims 
with an additional set of concerns when it comes to being available for cross-
examination.186 Despite these significant differences between rape and do-
mestic violence, there is a shortage of literature distinguishing Crawford’s 
application to domestic violence versus rape.187 To gain insight into how the 
judicial system commonly treats domestic violence cases, victims of domes-
tic violence are at least able to turn to precedent set forth by Crawford and 
subsequent holdings. In contrast, rape victims face more uncertainty due to 
the shortage of precedent as applicable to and literature written about these 
types of cases, and are often left to draw inferences from domestic violence 
cases. 
Finally, perhaps the most significant distinction between domestic vio-
lence and rape cases are the psychological differences that accompany these 
two cases. Although Crawford poses a similar threat to the prosecution of 
rape as it does to the prosecution of domestic violence, it does so in a dif-
ferent way. Both types of prosecution involve victim-declarants who have 
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valid reasons to be unavailable at trial, which, under Crawford, hinders the 
admissibility of their crucial hearsay evidence. The valid reasons that do-
mestic violence and rape victims have for being unavailable at trial, howev-
er, can differ. Because rape victims can experience psychological effects 
distinct from those experienced by domestic violence victims, they have 
different incentives for being unwilling to cooperate with prosecution and 
unavailable for cross-examination.188 
One such psychological difference between rape victims and domestic 
violence victims involves the impact of the abuse on the victim’s trust. The 
repetitiveness of the cycle of violence and the victim’s willingness to re-
main with the abuser are indicative of relentless trust, hope, and belief that 
the abuser will change for the better.189 In contrast, the most common and 
defining attribute of rape victims is their loss of trust in not only their abus-
ers, but also in people as a whole.190 This loss of trust can easily translate to 
the judicial system through victims’ projection and thereby motivate rape 
victims to be uncooperative with prosecutors.191 
Another psychological difference between victims of rape and victims 
of domestic violence involves their sense of control. Though not necessarily 
always true, domestic violence victims may feel that they are in control of 
whether to stay in their relationships and may feel that they have the power 
to change their abusers.192 On the other hand, rape victims’ sense of power 
and control is completely replaced by vulnerability because the act of rape 
entails being stripped of any consent or authorization over one’s body.193 This 
leads to a heightened sense of weakness and insecurity in rape victims, which 
is likely to prevent victims from being available for cross-examination.194 A 
public trial can make a rape victim feel further exposed and vulnerable, and 
the victim’s weakened self-assurance is likely to make him or her believe 
that any chance of success in the judicial system is futile.195 Had the rape 
victim provided any testimonial hearsay statements regarding the rape and 
the attacker, this lack of cooperation triggers Crawford and can seriously 
impede a successful prosecution.196 
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Moreover, although victims of domestic violence are sometimes una-
ware that they are in an abusive relationship and are psychologically in de-
nial of the violence they are experiencing, rape victims are more often than 
not aware that they have been raped and commonly are not in denial of the 
rape.197 Even if rape victims do deny the occurrence of their rape, this deni-
al is generally shorter in duration than that of domestic violence victims due 
to the lack of the cyclical nature of the violence, which serves to perpetuate 
feelings of denial.198 As a result, rape victims are more likely than domestic 
violence victims to seek counseling prior to trial because they overcome 
their denial more quickly than do victims of domestic violence and are able 
to realize what they have been subjected to.199  
Although counseling is a positive and healthy step for any victim of vio-
lence, it may deter rape victims from participating at trial. This is because 
rape victims may fear defense counsel gaining access to and exposing their 
counseling records in order to highlight embarrassing facts about the victim 
for the purpose of shedding doubt on their credibility and appeal.200 Again, 
this lack of cooperation triggers Crawford and likely deems inadmissible any 
testimonial hearsay made by the victim-declarant that could have been used 
in convicting the rapist, thereby causing the rapist to avoid incarceration and 
the victim to forego finding justice—a detriment to the victim’s psychological 
and emotional recovery.201 This outcome of Crawford affords the rapist the 
opportunity to victimize others and, in doing so, exacerbates the guilt felt by 
the original victim who chose to be unavailable at trial and consequently con-
tributed to the rapist’s increased likelihood of freedom.  
Despite these differences, both rape victims and domestic violence vic-
tims alike feel the immense psychological pain of inner-conflict surrounding 
prosecution. They both face the burden of deciding whether to confront their 
perpetrator at trial, and are subsequently overcome with guilt knowing that 
they have increased the likelihood that their perpetrator will not be convicted 
and will be free to victimize someone else.202 Domestic violence and rape 
victims feel enormous pressure knowing that this decision, upon which the 
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ultimate outcome of the trial and justice rests, is entirely in their hands. By 
placing this sort of responsibility on victims, Crawford perpetuates not only 
the psychological affliction or trauma these victims are already suffering, but 
also enables many rapists and perpetrators of domestic violence. 
B. Crawford Specifically in the Context of Rape 
Given the definitional, judicial, and psychological differences between 
rape and domestic violence, it necessarily follows that the application and 
subsequent effects of Crawford are often different between the two, thereby 
calling for a discussion of Crawford specifically in the context of rape. For 
example, one such difference between domestic violence and rape is that, 
because perpetrators of rape can be strangers or mere acquaintances, rape vic-
tims often have a strong, distinct incentive in being unavailable for cross-
examination—never seeing their attacker again.203 Conversely, this factor 
does not similarly disincentive many domestic violence victims to cooper-
ate with prosecution in the same way; these victims know their attackers, 
and thus may reason that they will have to face them eventually, so to avoid 
doing so at trial would prolong the inevitable.204 Additionally, because rape 
is defined as an act of sexual violence, whereas domestic violence does not 
necessarily always include a sexual component, rape victims understand 
that if they do testify at trial, they will be cross-examined regarding sexual 
acts.205 Rape victims are often intimidated by the potential shame and em-
barrassment they might face during cross-examination in front of a court-
room full of strangers, and can be deterred from testifying altogether.206  
Furthermore, in rape cases, it is even more difficult than in domestic 
violence cases to demonstrate that there was an ongoing emergency at the 
time the victim made out-of-court statements that are crucial to the defend-
ant’s conviction. This is because in rape cases, there is often no relationship 
between the victim and the perpetrator, but rather, just a single incident of 
sexual violence.207 A court is not likely to consider a rape victim’s state-
ments post-rape to a police officer discussing the events and the perpetrator 
as having been made during an ongoing emergency because rapists often 
flee the crime scene or are unknown to the victim.208 As a result, the vic-
tim’s hearsay statements are likely testimonial in nature, and thus will not 
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be admissible in court. In contrast, a domestic violence victim’s statements 
post-abuse to a police officer discussing the events and the perpetrator are 
more likely to be considered as made during an ongoing emergency because 
domestic violence constitutes an ongoing relationship by definition.209 
Thus, Crawford can be particularly detrimental to the prosecution of rape 
cases because it is distinctively difficult to qualify hearsay statements made 
by rape victims as non-testimonial. As a result, critical hearsay evidence 
that prosecutors rely on in rape cases will more often than not be deemed 
inadmissible, and therefore a conviction becomes unlikely.210 
C. Crawford and the Judicial System’s Disbelief of Rape Victims 
Like domestic violence victims who fear cooperating with prosecution 
and being available at trial, rape victims also fear trial for many reasons, but 
particularly due to the fear of being judged as liars by the judicial system.211 
There is a national, “widespread perception” amongst the public that rape 
victims lie about their assaults.212 As a component of the public, oftentimes 
the judicial system, which includes police officers, judges, jurors, and pros-
ecutors, adopts this perception and in doing so, discourages both rape vic-
tims from cooperating with prosecution and prosecutors from proceeding 
with rape cases.213 
The primary reasoning behind this perception that rape victims lie 
about their abuse is threefold. First, in nearly all jurisdictions nationwide, if 
a victim makes an accusation of rape but then later recants that accusation, 
evidence of this retraction is admissible at trial regardless of the reason be-
hind it.214 In admitting this evidence, courts, regardless of the proof or lack 
thereof, generally presume that whenever a rape victim recants, he or she 
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does so because the accusation was false.215 In reality, a rape victim may 
recant for any number of reasons other than because they were lying about 
the rape itself.216 In fact, many rape victims recant their accusations because 
when they initially inform others of their rape, the first reactions they re-
ceive are skepticism, often from close friends or family members.217 The 
rape victims reason that if people with whom they have a close relationship 
doubt their story, so will a judge or jury, thus they often choose to recant 
rather than face more skepticism. Another reason rape victims might recant 
is because they fear confronting their attackers, whether directly or indirect-
ly, through legal proceedings.218 Instead, the victims opt to eliminate any 
form of involvement with the perpetrator. Finally, rape victims commonly 
retract their accusations due to societal pressures; victims can feel pressure 
from family, friends, or even law enforcement to recant and not pursue 
prosecution due to any number of factors, such as the time, money, and re-
sources involved in a rape trial.219 Although rape victims have well-founded 
rationales for retracting their statements, their recantation is perceived with 
distinct undue cynicism and is given more weight than the accusation itself. 
Second, even without a recantation, courts commonly inaccurately 
deem an accusation as false because truthful rape victims often exhibit so-
called typical red-flag behavior of someone who is lying about their rape.220 
According to The National Center for Prosecution of Violence Against 
Women, such behavior includes omitting, exaggerating, or fabricating parts 
of their accounts.221 Additionally, rape victims are typically not hysterical, 
as a courtroom might expect them to be, when interviewed by doctors, 
nurses, police, prosecutors, and the like.222 There are explanations for this 
behavior that do not include lying, such rape trauma syndrome or post-
traumatic stress disorder.223 The symptoms associated with these conditions, 
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including depression, disassociation and anxiety, may lead to impaired 
memory issues or a calm demeanor, which courts can mistake as lying.224 
The stress and trauma that accompany rape have profound effects on the 
victim’s psyche, and because each victim copes with trauma and stress dif-
ferently, it is inaccurate for members of the judicial system to assume that 
because a victim is not acting how one would “presume” a rape victim 
should act, he or she must be lying. Furthermore, emotional components are 
not the only factors that affect memory.225 The accuracy of a rape victim’s 
memory can also be impaired by factors such as whether there was a weap-
on present during the crime, the age of the victim, the race of the perpetrator 
and the victim, and the method of questioning conducted by police, among 
others.226 Courts and jurors often do not recognize these valid explanations 
for the rape victim’s lying demeanor or red-flag behavior, and instead still 
mistakenly commonly correlate the behavior with deceit. Knowing this, 
prosecutors are reluctant to investigate and pursue these cases.227 
Finally, some conservative members of the judicial process place sig-
nificant weight on a rape victim’s past sexual conduct.228 They mistakenly 
believe that because a victim may have acted in a certain sexual way in the 
past, then that is necessarily indicative of his or her actions in the case at 
hand.229 For example, if a rape victim has a promiscuous past, those in-
volved in the judicial process commonly assume that the rape victim con-
sented to the actions that occurred during the rape.230 Similarly, if a rape 
victim had willingly engaged in sexual conduct with the perpetrator in the 
past, some assume that the conduct that occurred in the alleged rape was 
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also willing.231 When a rape victim claims that a sexual encounter that was 
once consensual later became nonconsensual, skepticism surrounding the 
change of mindset arises.  
In sum, Crawford’s application to rape cases poses the risk of re-
victimizing rape victims by forcing upon them the pressure of being availa-
ble at trial for cross-examination, which would mean being publicly ques-
tioned on a matter that is delicate in nature and already painful to merely 
discuss, let alone be interrogated about.232 Crawford further poses this risk 
because rape victims are not only probed about this highly sensitive topic, 
but, given the lens of skepticism that rape is so often perceived through, 
Crawford also asks rape victims to take the stand and be questioned on their 
credibility regarding this personal and uncomfortable topic.233 This signifi-
cant deterrent rape victims face from going to trial is a result of courts fail-
ing to appreciate that prior recantations, discrepancies in a story, a lying 
demeanor, or past sexual behavior do not necessarily indicate a false accu-
sation of rape. As a result, courts have allowed for the widespread belief that 
far more false accusations of rape occur than they actually do.234 Finally, 
Crawford also leaves rape victims feeling alone in their legal battles because 
it deters prosecutors from moving forward with rape cases due to the difficul-
ties it imposes on prosecuting these crimes.235 Given the significant chance of 
re-victimization and the complications prosecutors face as a result of Craw-
ford’s application to rape cases, it is apparent why a rape victim would be 
reluctant to be available at trial, which likely renders any of the victim’s 
testimonial hearsay that may have been used to convict the rapist inadmis-
sible.236 
D. Rape Shield Laws and Crawford 
Even if a rape victim chooses to bear the consequences of being avail-
able at trial, exceptions or loopholes to certain rules of evidence can operate 
to further victimize and shame rape victims. Simply being aware of these 
repercussions can further disincentive rape victims from being available at 
trial, thereby requiring prosecutors to face Crawford’s admissibility hurdles. 
Rape shield laws are an example of evidence rules that contain exceptions 
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harmful to rape victims and the successful prosecution of rape crimes. Rape 
shield laws, adopted by the federal and all state governments, are intended 
to protect a rape victim’s privacy interest by deeming inadmissible evidence 
offered to prove that a rape victim engaged in other sexual behavior or to 
prove a rape victim’s sexual predisposition.237  
Knowing such evidence will not be exposed in court, rape victims of-
ten find comfort in rape shield laws and feel empowered to seek justice 
against their abusers.238 However, there are exceptions to the protections 
offered by rape shield laws which, if met, can expose the rape victim to a 
level of vulnerability and embarrassment that oftentimes amounts to re-
victimization, which in turn makes the recovery process more lengthy and 
strenuous for the victim.239 This discourages rape victims from testifying, 
which triggers Crawford’s requirement that admissible hearsay be non-
testimonial.240 In the likely event that Crawford bars the admissibility of the 
victim’s hearsay in court by deeming it testimonial, then the likelihood of a 
successful conviction decreases significantly. 
To determine whether evidence regarding a rape victim’s prior sexual 
conduct will be admissible at trial, a court will hold a pre-trial in camera 
hearing to assess whether the evidence falls under any of the exceptions to 
the federal rape shield law, Federal Rule of Evidence 412.241 Such evidence 
is admissible under the exceptions if: (1) it is offered to prove that a person 
other than the accused “was the source of semen, injury, or other physical 
evidence;” (2) it is offered to “prove consent” between the victim and the 
defendant; or (3) “exclusion [of the evidence] would violate the defendant’s 
constitutional rights.”242  
Unfortunately for a rape victim, it is not difficult for one of these ex-
ceptions to be met and thereby allow evidence of the victim’s prior sexual 
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conduct to enter the courtroom. For instance, modern forensic science tech-
nologies have significantly advanced to the point to easily identify sources 
of “semen, injury, or physical evidence.”243 With the use of such technology 
at hand to defend their accusation, defendants are likely to call into question 
the source of physical evidence. Additionally, the heightened importance 
the government places on constitutional rights, such as due process, makes 
it likely that a court will lean in favor of protecting a defendant if his or her 
constitutional right is even at risk of being breached.244  
Finally, various ethical codes allow for lawyers to break the confiden-
tiality of attorney-client communications in certain circumstances, such as 
when they believe, even mistakenly, that disclosure is necessary to prevent 
knowingly helping the client commit a crime, like perjury, or fraud that may 
result in substantial injury to another.245 For instance, if a victim is explain-
ing to his or her lawyer that a preexisting consensual sexual relationship 
existed with the rapist, even just minutes before, a lawyer may misconstrue 
that to mean that the victim consented to the current sexual encounter in 
question.246 With this mistaken belief regarding rape’s key element of con-
sent, the lawyer may break confidentiality to avoid being compliant in per-
jury or to avoid incarcerating a potentially innocent person, because doing 
so can be considered substantially injurious to the opposing party.247 Know-
ing that this chance of breach in confidentiality exists, rape victims recog-
nize that there is potential for private information, which may inaccurately 
reflect on their consent, or lack thereof, to enter the courtroom. 
If a victim’s sexual history is admissible in court by way of an exception 
to a rape shield law, he or she risks exposure of intimate details at trial, and 
also faces a potentially intrusive, humiliating, and callous cross-examination 
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by a defense counsel that is well aware that Crawford requires the victim’s 
live testimony for the prosecution to have any likelihood at success.248 This 
awareness motivates defense counsel to make “cross-examination extremely 
unpleasant for the victim in hopes that she will lose interest in the case.”249 
For instance, if a rape victim had a prior sexual relationship with the defend-
ant, and evidence of the sexual history meets an exception to the applicable 
rape shield law, he or she may be reluctant to testify at trial knowing that de-
fense counsel will pursue an embarrassing or shameful line of questioning 
against the victim by emphasizing that prior sexual relationship.250 Such tac-
tics utilized by defense counsel in the cross-examination of rape victims often 
include questioning that probes into how many people a victim has had a sex-
ual encounter with, the feelings and sexual encounters, if any, the victim had 
with the defendant prior to the alleged rape, intimate details of the rape itself, 
such as whether there was mutual flirtation beforehand, and sometimes even 
obscure, irrelevant details such as personal hobbies.251 
Furthermore, because court documents are often made public, a victim’s 
private life can also be exposed outside of the courtroom, particularly through 
the media.252 Rape victims are already scrutinized due to the skepticism sur-
rounding their claims, but are often left feeling further exposed and vulnera-
ble when their sexual histories are made public.253 This is exactly what hap-
pened in 2004 in People v. Bryant after the media obtained records detailing 
the alleged rape victim’s prior sexual conduct.254 After facing judgment and 
humiliation both inside and outside of the courtroom, the alleged rape victim 
felt too victimized to continue to participate with the prosecution and dropped 
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the charges against the defendant.255 Although the presiding judge issued an 
order prohibiting the publication of the alleged victim’s name and the trial 
footage never showed her face, the media was able to obtain and broadcast 
her name, telephone number, photograph, home address, and email ad-
dress.256 Like the alleged victim in Bryant, many victims refuse to proceed 
with trial for fear of exposing their private, intimate lives.257 When a victim 
refuses to cooperate with prosecution and is not available for cross-
examination, understandably because the loopholes in rape shield laws create 
the strong possibility of being humiliated, violated or re-victimized, Crawford 
is triggered and the prosecutor likely must forego using the victim’s testimo-
nial statements as evidence—evidence that a conviction often hinges upon.258 
Rape victims commonly perceive the benefits of being available at tri-
al as outweighed by the negative consequences. Evidently, being available 
at trial advantages rape victims’ cases and significantly assists the prosecu-
tion and conviction of defendants because courts need not address a testi-
monial classification issue if victims are present at trial.259 On the other 
hand, being available at trial does not necessarily guarantee a conviction. It 
does, however, almost always guarantee an array of negative consequences: 
the victims must face their rapists once again, they must defend their trust-
worthiness that has been newly shattered by a system that is often disbeliev-
ing, they must relinquish control to the justice system much as they relin-
quished, albeit unwillingly, control to their rapists, they may face potential 
backlash from skeptical strangers who criticize their sexual history, and they 
will risk the discomfort that accompanies having their past sexual histories 
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exposed during cross-examination if a rape shield law exception applies. It 
is apparent that rape victims have many legitimate and substantiated con-
cerns that discourage them from being available for cross-examination. 
These disincentives, coupled with Crawford’s impediments, significantly 
interfere with the successful prosecution of rape cases, and as a result, many 
rapists are ultimately able escape conviction and incarceration. 
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS FOR MINIMIZING THE DISADVANTAGES 
CRAWFORD PLACES ON VICTIMS IN DOMESTIC  
VIOLENCE AND RAPE CASES 
Crawford v. Washington reflects a grave threat to domestic violence 
and rape cases and victims across the nation. Although there has been a 
shortfall of effective safeguards put into place for these types of cases and 
victims, Crawford is not beyond remedy. Its current detrimental effect of 
decreasing the likelihood of convictions in domestic violence and rape 
prosecutions with an unavailable declarant can, at the very least, be mini-
mized. This, however, will require substantive changes, which can fall un-
der the umbrella of either modifying interpretations of key terminology in 
Crawford or providing an overall shift in focus to affording victims equal 
protection, rather than a primary focus on the defendant’s Sixth Amendment 
constitutional right to confrontation. 
Although the fundamental component of Crawford is whether hearsay 
is testimonial, the Crawford holding itself lacked a comprehensive defini-
tion of this categorization, and even subsequent cases, such as Davis v. 
Washington and Hammon v. Indiana, defined the term in a way that leaves 
room for discrepancy amongst courts.260 By merely stating that proclama-
tions made during an ongoing emergency are the antithesis of testimonial 
statements, Davis and Hammon afford courts the discretion to decide what 
constitutes an ongoing emergency.261 Because an emergency is a highly 
subjective determination made after considering many factors and contextu-
al components, the amount of discretion, and therefore inconsistency and 
discrepancy amongst courts, is abundant.262 To create more comprehensive 
guidelines and consistent precedent on which prosecutors and victims can 
rely, the term testimonial must be modified and codified to delineate an in-
clusive list of factors that courts must consider, such as whether the hearsay 
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statement was an excited utterance, present sense impression, or a statement 
made to medical personnel.263 
Furthermore, Crawford is also flawed because it mistakenly assumes 
that the defendant necessarily wants the ability to confront his or her accus-
er. This assumption overlooks the fact that defendants who are aware of 
how Crawford can operate, to render essential hearsay evidence against 
them inadmissible if there is no opportunity for confrontation, have an in-
centive to procure the unavailability of their accuser.264 Although Giles v. 
California discusses the application of the forfeiture by wrongdoing doc-
trine in the domestic violence context, the Giles precedent alone is insuffi-
cient in that it does not discuss the application of the forfeiture by wrongdo-
ing doctrine specifically in the context of rape, nor did it result in consistent 
and common application in domestic violence cases.265 By primarily focus-
ing on the defendant’s right to confrontation, Crawford fails to appreciate 
that defendants are taking advantage of that emphasis in order to secure ev-
identiary benefits at the expense of victims. Accordingly, this translates into 
the second modification needed: the shift in focus to victims. 
By shifting the holding in Crawford to increase the focus on the rights 
of victims, so that, at minimum, their rights are weighed equally with the 
defendants’ rights, courts can incentivize victims to be available at trial. An 
increased focus on the rights of victims would encourage their availability 
at trial by offering various safeguards, such as reducing the time between 
investigation and trial, requiring tamer cross-examination of victims, and 
allowing psychological support at trial for victims, thereby helping victims 
feel more secure and confident in the courtroom and minimizing the psy-
chological pain they experience during the prosecution process. Ultimately, 
if the shift in focus is successful and does empower victims to be available 
at trial, Crawford’s holding would be inapplicable. 
In sum, proposed solutions to Crawford’s damaging consequences in 
domestic violence and rape cases with unavailable declarants fall under the 
categories of either re-defining testimonial or shifting the focus to the vic-
tim. To adequately modify the key element of testimonial, its definition 
must be restricted and the definition of ongoing emergency must be ex-
panded to include more hearsay statements made by unavailable declar-
ants.266 To appropriately shift the focus to victims and afford them the pro-
                                                                                                                           
 263 See Chase, supra note 72, at 1108; Leventhal & Aldrich, supra note 72, at 86–87, 92–93; 
King-Ries, supra note 128, at 318–24. 
 264 Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 376–77 (2008); Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60–68. 
 265 See Leventhal & Aldrich, supra note 72, at 98; Tuerkheimer, supra note 96, at 718–20 
(discussing the inconsistency in the application of the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine in cases 
of intimate violence despite its particular importance in such cases). 
 266 See Leventhal & Aldrich, supra note 72, at 98; Tuerkheimer, supra note 96, at 718–20. 
46 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 37:1 
tection equal to what is afforded to defendants under Crawford, more em-
phasis and advocacy should be placed on the forfeiture by wronging excep-
tion, and the protections of victims before and during trial should be im-
proved.267 These proposed solutions will effectively mitigate Crawford’s 
effect of creating difficulty in obtaining convictions in domestic violence 
and rape cases with an unavailable declarant.  
A. Restricting the Definition of Testimonial in the Contexts  
of Domestic Violence and Rape 
Under Crawford, if a hearsay statement made by an unavailable de-
clarant qualifies as testimonial, it is inadmissible at trial unless the declarant 
testifies in court or the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine 
the declarant.268 Several cases post-Crawford attempted to clarify this testi-
monial inquiry, including Davis and Hammon, which define a testimonial 
statement as one made for the purpose of gathering evidence with an “eye 
toward trial,” as opposed to statements made for the purpose of assisting in 
an ongoing emergency.269 This definition of testimonial is particularly rele-
vant in domestic violence and rape cases because the circumstances sur-
rounding such cases make the discussion of an ongoing emergency particu-
larly pertinent.270 Unfortunately, many of the hearsay statements made in 
these types of cases are frequently and inconsistently not categorized as 
made during an ongoing emergency, and the victims’ crucial incriminating 
words are deemed inadmissible.271 In an effort to provide consistency and 
predictability in the determination of whether a statement is testimonial, 
state and federal rules of evidence should codify a statute that would uni-
formly deem the hearsay exceptions of excited utterances, present sense 
impressions, and statements made to medical personnel as testimonial and 
thereby admissible at trial regardless of the declarant’s availability. This 
codification of the definition would help avoid affording too much leverage 
to defendants in domestic violence and rape cases and too little chance of 
success to victims.  
Although most courts have consistently held that excited utterances 
and present sense impressions made to non-law enforcement personnel are 
non-testimonial, courts have been less consistent in regard to excited utter-
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ances and present sense impressions made to law enforcement personnel.272 
In these latter situations, the court will apply a case-by-case analysis to de-
termine the purpose of the statement and assess whether it was made with a 
prosecutorial purpose or for the purpose of receiving aid in an emergen-
cy.273 Similarly, the admissibility of statements made to medical personnel 
are typically also analyzed on a case-by-case basis after a determination of 
whether the statement was made with an “eye toward trial” or for the pur-
pose of receiving medical diagnosis or treatment after an emergency.274 Ra-
ther than applying a case-by-case analysis, courts should consistently deem 
out-of-court statements that fall under one of these three exceptions as non-
testimonial, and thus admissible under Crawford regardless of the availabil-
ity of the victim-declarant or whether the statement was made to law en-
forcement. This way, prosecutors can avoid the impediments caused by the 
inconsistent line of jurisprudence following Crawford that potentially pre-
vents crucial hearsay from being admitted at trial when there is an unavaila-
ble declarant, even if it falls under one of the aforementioned exceptions. 
Subsequently, this would allow for the appropriately increased conviction of 
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defendants and for victims of rape and domestic violence to find recourse 
without facing the trauma and stress that accompanies cross-examination.275 
To most effectively resolve Crawford’s adverse impacts in the domes-
tic violence and rape contexts, courts must interpret certain hearsay state-
ments, ones evidently not made with an “eye toward trial,” as non-
testimonial. According to the Federal Rules of Evidence, the following are 
several hearsay exceptions: an excited utterance, which is a statement “re-
lating to a startling event or condition, made while under the stress or ex-
citement that it caused;” a present sense impression, which is a statement 
“describing or explaining an event or condition, made while or immediately 
after the declarant perceived it;” and a statement to medical personnel, 
which is a statement “made for—and is reasonably pertinent to—medical 
diagnosis or treatment and describes medical history, past or present symp-
toms or sensations, their inception or their general cause.”276  
Currently, some courts hold that these statements are testimonial in na-
ture simply if they are made to law enforcement personnel.277 In actuality, if 
a statement falls under any of these categories, it should automatically be 
designated as non-testimonial, regardless of who the statement is made to, 
because statements of this nature are inherently not made with an “eye to-
ward trial.”278 This is because all three of these exceptions occur in a con-
text in which the declarant would not have either the time or mental capaci-
ty to fabricate, or, in the case of statements made to medical personnel, 
would have a strong interest not to fabricate.279 Thus, these statements 
should uniformly and consistently be deemed non-testimonial, regardless if 
they are made to law enforcement personnel or not, and should therefore be 
admissible at trial.280 If courts were able to appreciate the nature of these 
statements and consistently held that they are not testimonial, this would 
prevent Crawford from asking victims of domestic violence and rape to sac-
rifice their mental and emotional well-being for the sake of obtaining a con-
viction at trial. Success at trial could then be possible without their live tes-
timony because the crucial evidence they provided beforehand would be 
admissible.281 
This presumption that the aforementioned hearsay exceptions are al-
ways non-testimonial is particularly strong in the context of domestic vio-
                                                                                                                           
 275 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803–804. 
 276 FED. R. EVID. 803–804; Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51–52 (2004); Chase, 
supra note 72, at 1106–13; see also supra notes 67, 68, 70 and accompanying text. 
 277 Chase, supra note 72, at 1116–19. 
 278 See FED. R. EVID. 803–804; Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51–52. 
 279 See Chase, supra note 72, at 1106–13. 
 280 See FED. R. EVID. 803–804; Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51–52. 
 281 See FED. R. EVID. 803–804; Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51–52. 
2017] A Call for Change in Domestic Violence and Rape Prosecutions 49 
lence and rape cases because of the circumstances surrounding domestic 
violence and rape. For example, because domestic violence and rape cases 
are highly emotional, it is likely that statements made during or immediate-
ly after the occurrence of such events will be considered excited utteranc-
es.282 For instance, in the context of rape, a victim may exclaim, “he violat-
ed me!” and in cases of domestic violence, a victim may exclaim, “he’s go-
ing to kill me if he finds out I left!” In both situations, the emotional stakes 
are high and the victims’ statements are triggered by a startling and stressful 
event. When a domestic violence or rape victim makes an excited utterance 
to law enforcement or non-law enforcement personnel, he or she is not 
thinking about assisting prosecution, but is rather overcome with stress or 
fear.283 Thus, based on the underlying premise of the excited utterance ex-
ception that the victim is too startled to fabricate, it should be presumed that 
the domestic violence or rape victim is too startled to make statements with 
an “eye toward trial.”284 
Similarly, a present sense impression is an instantaneous statement in 
which the declarant is describing what he or she perceives at the moment, 
and is therefore thinking about his or her existing impression, not the pro-
spect of prosecution.285 In domestic violence and rape cases, these victims, 
regardless of whether they are speaking to law enforcement or non-law en-
forcement, are describing their physical attacks as they are happening. For 
instance, in rape cases, the victim may call 911 and say, “I was just raped 
and my rapist is still in my house, looking for a weapon.” In domestic vio-
lence cases, the victim may say, “I can hear my husband loading his gun 
while saying he’s going to kill me.” Both statements involve present sense 
impressions, and should therefore be deemed testimonial, regardless of 
whether they were made to law enforcement, because the victim is describ-
ing a crime that is currently occurring. Again, the underlying principle be-
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hind the present sense impression hearsay exception is that these statements 
are reliable and trustworthy because declarants do not have the time to fab-
ricate. If that is the case, then it can be safely presumed that declarants in 
domestic violence and rape cases also do not have the time to fabricate 
statements with the foresight of prosecution in mind.286 
Furthermore, even after a rape or domestic violence crime occurs, 
many victims face long-lasting psychological effects that cause them relive 
the attacks.287 This is because, in addition to the actual physical violence 
that accompanies these attacks, the victims, like anyone suffering from 
post-traumatic stress, are then trapped in their own psychological torment 
both through vivid and distressful flashbacks and memories that occur after 
the attack, which can restore a victim’s frame of mind to the state it was in 
during the attack.288 Therefore, domestic violence and rape victims are sus-
ceptible to re-excitement for purposes of excited utterances, and to re-
visualization or re-hearing for purposes of present sense impressions.289 The 
same logic and reasoning that makes initial excited utterances and present 
sense impressions reliable—that these statements are reactive and involve 
no time to deliberate a fabrication—also applies to excited utterances and 
present sense impressions made during a flashback of domestic violence or 
rape, meaning they should be admissible at trial.290 If courts appreciated 
that victims make non-testimonial present-sense impressions to law en-
forcement and non-law enforcement personnel both during and after their 
attacks, more essential and incriminatory hearsay could be admitted at trial 
without having to force emotionally and psychologically vulnerable victims 
to be available for cross-examination. 
 Finally, because medical personnel are not trained or associated with the 
legal process, statements made to them by domestic violence and rape victims 
are likewise made for a non-prosecutorial, non-testimonial purpose—to seek 
medical attention.291 Moreover, because both domestic violence and rape vic-
tims often experience feelings of vulnerability after their attacks, these state-
ments are often made for psychological, in addition to physical, assistance.292 
Courts must recognize that statements made in such a state are not made with 
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an “eye toward trial,” and should always interpret these statements in the rape 
and domestic violence context as non-testimonial.293  
Proponents of Sixth Amendment rights need not be concerned that al-
lowing these hearsay exceptions to stand under Crawford will impinge a 
defendant’s constitutional right to confrontation.294 Because this proposal is 
limited to these three particular hearsay exceptions, it would have a narrow 
application; therefore many other hearsay statements may still be deemed 
testimonial and inadmissible under Crawford. For example, the hearsay ex-
ceptions of the declarant’s statement of personal or family history or a 
statement of the declarant’s then existing mental, emotional, or physical 
condition will still be subject to be scrutiny under Crawford.295 In other 
words, although the hearsay exceptions of excited utterances, present sense 
impressions, and statements made for medical diagnosis or treatment can be 
presumed non-testimonial, all other hearsay exceptions still must endure 
Crawford’s case-by-case analysis of whether the statement is classified as 
non-testimonial or having been made during an ongoing emergency.296  
Furthermore, courts have always held that the fairness for both parties 
in a criminal proceeding must be balanced.297 Although Sixth Amendment 
proponents are correct in arguing that a defendant’s right to confrontation 
must not be arbitrarily circumvented, they must also recognize that such a 
right is not absolute.298 This means that in order to “maintain the integrity of 
the judicial process,” courts must balance the defendant’s constitutional 
rights with rights that protect victims, such as the aforementioned hearsay 
exceptions.299 In other words, because Crawford strengthens and further 
solidifies the defendant’s right to confrontation, it is equally fair to the vic-
tims, and in the interest of judicial integrity, that courts proportionally coun-
terbalance Crawford by uniformly interpreting excited utterances, present 
sense impressions, and statements made for the purpose of medical diagno-
sis to withstand the burden that Crawford places on victims.300 
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B. Expanding the Concept of Ongoing Emergency 
The definition of an ongoing emergency is essential to the application 
of Crawford because a statement made in the course of an ongoing emer-
gency is not considered testimonial, and thus is not barred from admissibil-
ity at trial under Crawford.301 This concept is particularly relevant to do-
mestic violence and rape cases because the circumstances of such incidents 
are characterized by their urgency and sense of crisis.302 Despite this im-
portance, what constitutes an ongoing emergency was never explicitly de-
fined in Crawford or subsequent cases.303 As a result, lower courts have 
struggled to apply the ongoing emergency test consistently and objective-
ly.304 Davis and Hammon attempted to clarify what constitutes an ongoing 
emergency, but ultimately caused further confusion for lower courts by 
evaluating factually similar cases yet reaching opposite conclusions.305  
 Davis and Hammon both involved excited utterances made by a victim 
of domestic violence.306 The victim’s statements in Davis were considered 
made during an ongoing emergency, therefore not testimonial, and were 
admissible in court regardless of the unavailability of the victim-declarant, 
but the victim’s statements in Hammon were not.307 In 2006, the U.S. Su-
preme Court distinguished these two cases in holding that in Davis, the vic-
tim was describing the events over the telephone to a 911 operator as they 
were occurring in an effort to obtain immediate help, whereas in Hammon, 
the victim detailed the accounts of the domestic violence attack to the police 
once they arrived on the scene after the attack had already occurred.308 This 
emphasis on the lapse of time between when the crime occurred and when 
the statement was made, however, is not an accurate or comprehensive as-
sessment of an ongoing emergency. Simply because a declarant is not visu-
ally witnessing the danger she fears while speaking to law enforcement 
does not mean the declarant is no longer in danger. Moreover, the fact that a 
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single attack is over does not mean all attacks are over; because domestic 
violence involves an ongoing relationship and “[m]ost rape victims know 
their assailants,” it is not improbable that such attacks can occur again.309 
This was particularly true in Hammon, where the husband shoved his 
wife into broken glass, hit her on the chest, threw her to the floor, destroyed 
multiple items around the house, prevented the wife from leaving the house 
by breaking their car, and even attacked their daughter.310 Furthermore, the 
police had to actively keep the husband separated from his wife. The hus-
band in Hammon made several attempts to interject in his wife’s conversa-
tion with the police and became irritable when the officers prevented him 
from getting near her.311 Despite these apparent signs of anger and violence 
that the husband displayed both during the initial attack and when law en-
forcement arrived, the court classified the wife’s statements to the police as 
ones that were not made during an ongoing emergency.312 The Court made 
this determination only because at the time the police were present and 
questioned the victim, the husband was not attacking the victim due to po-
lice intervention.313 This reasoning disregards the fact that the husband had 
displayed an ongoing and repetitive pattern of violence toward his wife and 
would likely attack again.314 
As evidenced by Davis, Hammon, and many subsequent cases, there is 
inconsistency amongst how courts interpret an ongoing emergency.315 Codi-
fication of a definition of an ongoing emergency would unify how courts 
treat this concept, particularly in the domestic violence context. In 2004, as 
a response and counterbalance to the strengthened Confrontation Clause, 
Oregon codified a rule of evidence that recognizes that domestic violence 
cases are, by definition, always an ongoing emergency because in such situ-
ations, just because a single attack has ended does not necessarily mean the 
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emergency has ended.316 Oregon Evidence Code Rule 803(26) admits at 
trial any hearsay statement made to a government official within twenty-
four hours of a domestic violence attack, regardless of whether the state-
ment is testimonial, so long as it bears “sufficient indicia of reliability,” 
much like the Ohio v. Roberts test.317 Oregon’s reversion to Roberts affords 
prosecutors more discretion and flexibility in admitting hearsay. This 
movement was made to counterbalance the strengthened Confrontation 
Clause in an effort to provide safeguards for domestic violence cases be-
cause they are particularly susceptible to the downfalls of Crawford.318 Alt-
hough Oregon limits this rule to the domestic violence context, this Article 
proposes that federal and state evidence rules should codify the twenty-four 
hour rule as applicable to both domestic violence and rape cases, particular-
ly because of the similarities in the psychological effects that domestic vio-
lence and rape victims experience.319 
The twenty-four-hour rule is appropriate because it still adequately 
safeguards a defendant’s confrontation right by setting a succinct time limit 
on admissible hearsay statements in the domestic violence and rape contexts 
that necessarily indicates reliability.320 Statements made by domestic vio-
lence victims, and likely by rape victims, are most reliable within twenty-
four hours of an incident.321 After that period, cooperation diminishes, in-
fluences of coercion increase, and memories fade.322 Thus, if testimonial 
statements made after twenty-four hours are not sufficiently reliable to war-
rant admissibility, the defendant need not worry about the deprivation of his 
or her confrontation right. Under the twenty-four-hour rule, a defendant’s 
right to confront the accuser and the rights that protect victims are suffi-
ciently balanced. 
Furthermore, the twenty-four-hour rule is constructive for law en-
forcement personnel, people who are often viewed by the courts as serving 
an investigative purpose when speaking with victims. Under the rule, police 
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officers responding to a domestic violence or rape attack within twenty-four 
hours need not focus on whether they are ascertaining an emergency for 
purposes of trial, but rather can safely assume that anything falling within 
this time period satisfies Crawford.323 Thus, police officers could focus on 
aiding the situation in the best way possible, and not on formalities that 
would foster a testimonial statement.324 Likewise, courts would no longer 
have to evaluate whether a law enforcement officer is responding to an 
emergency or gathering evidence during this time, a distinction that can 
create a serious barrier to admissibility. 
The twenty-four-hour rule is also appropriate as a policy matter because 
perpetrators of domestic violence and rape often embody dangerous, some-
times unapparent, attributes that necessitate time to subside or become less 
threatening.325 In other words, anger, and even a propensity for violence, can 
linger within the perpetrator and resurface after a police officer leaves the 
victim, which can develop into a continuation of the first attack or a second 
attack. This is indicative of an ongoing emergency even when a police officer 
hears the victim’s statements after the initial attack has passed, and supports 
the inclusion of the twenty-four-hour rule in state and federal evidence rules 
to allow for greater admissibility of victim statements. 
Nonetheless, the twenty-four-hour rule will certainly be accompanied 
by criticism. Although proponents of the Sixth Amendment might argue that 
the rule will circumvent the right to confrontation by admitting more hear-
say statements at trial and ultimately convicting more defendants who never 
had the opportunity to face their accusers, such fears can be alleviated. This 
is because the twenty-four-hour rule will narrowly apply to victims of do-
mestic violence or rape, not to third parties or police officers.326 The rule 
shall apply only in circumstances where the victim is still at risk, not if a 
third party is at risk nor if a police officer simply forgets to elicit a state-
ment from the victim. With this limitation, the twenty-four-hour rule creates 
a narrow exception to Crawford for the specific circumstances of rape and 
domestic violence given their sensitive contexts and particularly high sus-
ceptibility to Crawford, rather than creating a broad or sweeping exception 
to the Confrontation Clause. 
Some Sixth Amendment proponents argue that a twenty-four-hour rule 
is unnecessary because police officers already initially approach their inves-
tigations under the presumption that there is an ongoing emergency, mean-
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ing that the safety of the victim, rather than, say, the formality of question-
ing, is a priority.327 Critics claim that, by calling for a blanket definition of 
when an ongoing emergency occurs, the twenty-four hour rule not only dis-
credits police officers, who already approach their job duties under the pre-
sumption of a need for urgency and safety, but it also takes away flexibility 
from police officers’ ability to asses varying situations and respond accord-
ingly. For instance, one argument is that the twenty-four-hour rule’s blanket 
application to an explicit and set time frame leaves no room for accommo-
dation. This is because even if it is blatantly obvious there is no ongoing 
emergency or the emergency has ended, the rule would not permit police 
officers to begin their formal line of questioning and conduct their investi-
gative business in an efficient and timely manner until those twenty-four 
hours have passed.328 These fears, however, are unfounded. The twenty-
four-hour rule will provide guidelines to aid in eliminating potential manip-
ulation of the judicial process by inserting a rigid time frame that objective-
ly constitutes an ongoing emergency, thereby eliminating any subjective 
considerations or manipulations, such as intentional or unintentional biased 
maneuvering by the police.329 Thus, the twenty-four-hour rule does not im-
pinge on Confrontation Clause rights by creating new exceptions, but mere-
ly elaborates on what constitutes an ongoing emergency, a subcategory of a 
non-testimonial situation, and limits that situation to certain contexts. 
For the reasons set forth above, Congress and state legislatures should 
follow Oregon’s path and incorporate the twenty-four-hour rule into their 
evidence rules, slightly modifying it to apply to both domestic violence and 
rape contexts. By implementing a twenty-four-hour rule, it will be easier for 
prosecutors to admit domestic violence and rape victims’ statements at trial 
under Crawford despite unavailability. This will not only preserve the de-
fendant’s confrontation rights by limiting the statements to the period in 
which they are reliable, but it will also help protect victims from further 
harm by allowing police officers to focus their attention on how to best 
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serve the needs of victims and by increasing the conviction of perpetrators, 
even without the participation of victims at trial.330 
C. Codification of the Forfeiture by Wrongdoing Doctrine 
Crawford seems to limit all hearsay statements with its testimonial 
analysis, even if such statements meet a hearsay exception. The forfeiture 
by wrongdoing doctrine, however, escapes Crawford’s reach.331 According 
to this doctrine, a statement that would normally be inadmissible under 
hearsay rules or Crawford is entirely admissible under the forfeiture by 
wrongdoing doctrine if the defendant intentionally procures the witness’s 
unavailability through wrongful acts.332 Thus, a defendant’s Confrontation 
Clause rights are extinguished through forfeiture.333 For the reasons dis-
cussed below, to ensure consistent application of the forfeiture by wrongdo-
ing doctrine to domestic violence and rape cases, and in turn remedy Craw-
ford’s prejudicial impacts on these types of cases, state legislatures should 
codify the doctrine. 
In Giles, the Supreme Court held that requisite intent can be inferred in 
cases of domestic violence because such cases are often characterized by 
threat, intimidation, or manipulation against the victim, or other “wrongdo-
ings” intended to control the victim in various ways, including procuring 
their availability or lack thereof.334 The forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine 
proves to be essential in prosecuting domestic violence cases in that it pro-
vides an avenue of relief for victim-declarants who previously made essen-
tial hearsay statements that would be beneficial to the prosecution of their 
attacker, but are unavailable for cross-examination due to the wrongdoing 
of their attacker.335 The Giles precedent allows for a special application of 
the doctrine by recognizing how the psychological components of domestic 
violence, such as manipulation and control, enable a valid inference that if a 
domestic violence victim is unavailable, it is likely due to the pattern of the 
abusive relationship.336 
Although rape is not defined in the same manner that domestic vio-
lence is, the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine should also apply to the rape 
context. From a policy perspective, this doctrine applies to domestic vio-
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lence cases because those cases involve an ongoing relationship character-
ized by a history and pattern of threats or attempts to control or isolate the 
victim.337 These wrongdoings against the victim are intended to manipulate 
the victim, procure the victim’s availability in various situations and ways, 
and are a part of what defines a domestic violence relationship itself, there-
by making the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine highly relevant and appli-
cable to these cases.338 Unlike domestic violence, rape is not traditionally 
defined by this cyclical relationship; however, the context of rape shares 
other similar defining characteristics with domestic violence that renders 
the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine relevant and applicable.339 
For instance, although rape victims may not have relationships with 
their attackers based on past or ongoing threatening patterns, rape victims 
are often threatened and coerced by their attackers.340 Furthermore, as in 
domestic violence contexts, the attackers, rapists, cause the severe psycho-
logical trauma that their victims face.341 Courts should realize that this 
amounts to intentional infliction, and that such psychological trauma, in-
cluding feelings of weakness, vulnerability, and mistrust, oftentimes pro-
cures rape victims’ absence from court.342 Despite the fact that the forfeiture 
by wrongdoing doctrine has significant potential to support victimless or 
evidence-based prosecutions, like domestic violence and rape cases where 
the victim is unavailable and Crawford applies, courts have rarely invoked 
the doctrine in these contexts.343 
To ensure the application of the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine to 
rape and domestic violence cases, states should codify the doctrine to allow 
admission of testimonial hearsay statements made by victims who would 
otherwise be unable to obtain justice against their perpetrators as a result of 
Crawford and their unavailability at the hands of their attackers.344 When the 
forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine has been applied at the federal level, vic-
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tims have been able to find recourse from the conundrum caused by Craw-
ford’s application, specifically in cases of domestic violence and rape.345 It is 
particularly easy for defendants to increase their own likelihood of success at 
trial by procuring the absence of their victim in those cases because they are 
characterized by intimidation, vulnerability, sensitivity, intimacy, and manipu-
lation.346 Thus, the defendant may not have to do anything more than the 
crime already committed in order to procure the victim’s unavailability be-
cause the crime itself already set the groundwork for the victim-declarant to 
be under the intimidation, fear, or manipulation of the defendant.347 That 
alone can procure the unavailability of the already vulnerable and sensitive 
victim.348 By codifying the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine, however, 
states could grant victims the same relief that federal courts do when they 
apply the doctrine to cases of domestic violence and rape.349 Under the forfei-
ture by wrongdoing doctrine, domestic violence and rape victims would no 
longer feel the pressure of the case resting entirely on their shoulders because 
a conviction would no longer hinge on their availability at trial. Hearsay 
statements made by a domestic violence or rape victim would be admissible 
so long as there is proof that the defendant intentionally procured their una-
vailability, and, as discussed above, this is commonly the case in these con-
texts.350  
To codify the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine and ensure its con-
sistent and continuous application to domestic violence and rape cases, ad-
vocacy groups and individuals should lobby state legislatures to adopt Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6), the federal codification of the forfeiture by 
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wrongdoing doctrine.351 Rule 804(b)(6) provides that an unavailable declar-
ant’s hearsay is admissible at trial when the defendant intentionally or 
“wrongfully cause[d] the declarant’s unavailability,” thereby waiving the 
defendant’s right to confrontation.352 It would be relatively easy for states to 
adopt 804(b)(6) because it is a straightforward and comprehensive declara-
tion of the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine and because most states have 
already modeled their evidence rules after the Federal Rules of Evidence.353 
Currently, only a minority of states have adopted and codified the doctrine 
in their rules of evidence.354 Some other states have applied the doctrine as 
a common law or equitable principle, but others have failed to do so, per-
haps because those states find codification unnecessary due to existing case 
law.355 Despite this overwhelming lack of a statutory foundation for the 
doctrine, however, no state court has ever explicitly rejected the forfeiture 
by wrongdoing doctrine when confronted by it.356 Nonetheless, it would be 
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beneficial for all states to codify the doctrine to ensure its consistent appli-
cation and that the doctrine is not overlooked. Codification will be a “relia-
ble and effective means of insuring that there will be a prophylactic rule” 
against procuring the declarant’s unavailability through a wrongdoing.357 
This is especially vital in domestic violence and rape cases given the high 
likelihood of victims whose unavailability has been procured by defendants 
as a result of the severe psychological components, such as control, vulner-
ability, and manipulation, that accompany these contexts.358 
In addition to codifying the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine, state 
courts, in applying the doctrine, should expressly recognize that wrongdoing 
and intentional procurement includes subjecting the victim to the honeymoon 
phase, a phenomenon present in domestic violence and likely rape, too.359 
The honeymoon phase itself is a form of abuse as it is part of the cycle of vio-
lence involved in domestic abuse cases. Perpetrators use the honeymoon 
phase as a tool to manipulate their victims from escaping abuse by creating 
false pretenses of change and improvement.360 Courts should recognize that 
the honeymoon phase allows a defendant to procure a declarant’s unavailabil-
ity to testify, not only through violent intimidation, but also by misleading the 
declarant to believe that things will change for the better, that the defendant 
loves the victim, or that the violence was a deserved punishment.361  
Moreover, although the honeymoon phase does not exist in rape cases 
per se, a variation of this type of manipulation can exist.362 For example, 
rapists who are in a position of authority over rape victims, as is oftentimes 
the case with incest and child sexual assault, can manipulate their victims 
into believing that what they are doing is normal and out of love.363 Alt-
hough Giles did acknowledge that the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine 
includes patterns of abuse, threats, coercion or control, the holding did not 
explicitly discuss how coercion can include the honeymoon phase, or false 
and manipulative promises of love, normalcy and change.364 Furthermore, 
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the holding did not expand beyond the context of domestic violence.365 
Courts must realize this expansion of what constitutes wrongdoing under 
the doctrine, thereby setting a consistent precedent for future domestic vio-
lence and rape cases. 
Opponents might argue that such codification and expansion of the for-
feiture by wrongdoing doctrine risks creating too many holes in a defend-
ant’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.366 For instance, as one of the 
primary supporters of the Confrontation Clause, Justice Scalia would likely 
appreciate this criticism as he emphasized in Crawford that the purpose and 
intent behind the Sixth Amendment should not be subject to vague evidence 
rules that can be manipulated.367 Furthermore, other critics of the forfeiture 
by wrongdoing doctrine argue that, unlike in the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
nowhere in the Sixth Amendment is there a mention of intent or motive; 
rather, the defendant’s right to confrontation is absolute.368 In other words, 
the application of the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine under the Federal 
Rules of Evidence would undermine the Constitution. Despite these criti-
cisms, the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine does not in fact conflict with 
the Confrontation Clause; it only places control of the right to confrontation 
in the very hands of the person it belongs to—the defendant. A defendant 
must take an affirmative action to strip himself of his Sixth Amendment 
right.369 Otherwise, the right presumptively stands.370 By placing the de-
fendant in control of his or her own constitutional right, the forfeiture by 
wrongdoing doctrine conforms to the historical intent and purpose behind 
constitutional rights, such as incentivizing moral conduct.371 
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D. Improving Safeguards for Domestic Violence and Rape  
Victims Before and During Trial 
1. Reducing Time Between Investigation and Trial Through Rape Kit 
Analysis 
One way to ameliorate the negative consequences of Crawford’s appli-
cation to rape cases, in particular, is to provide safeguards for victims before 
and during trial so that they are confident in their decision to be available 
for cross-examination. This type of support would allow for the admissibil-
ity of their statements, whether testimonial or not, and increase the likeli-
hood of conviction.372 One potential safeguard is to simply reduce the time 
between the attack and the first opportunity for cross-examination.373 As 
time passes, victims often become increasingly less cooperative with prose-
cution.374 Reduced time between the attack and cross-examination allows 
for less opportunity for the victim’s fear of testifying at trial to heighten, 
and less opportunity for the defendant to threaten or coerce the victim from 
testifying.375Although courts cannot necessarily choose to hear a case 
quickly or sooner than others, there is a way for police and lab technicians 
to help expedite the path toward trial and how quickly rape cases get on 
court dockets—by decreasing the rape kit backlog.376 
The conviction of rapists relies heavily on DNA evidence gathered 
from a rape kit.377 A rape kit, also known as a sexual assault kit, is a pack-
age of items that is utilized to collect evidence, including DNA evidence, 
from a rape victim’s “body, clothes, and other personal belongings.”378 If a 
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prosecutor sees that a rape kit has been used at the crime scene and DNA 
evidence has been analyzed to identify the defendant, he or she is more like-
ly to file a complaint and pursue the case through to trial.379 This encour-
ages rape victims to cooperate with prosecution by increasing their confi-
dence in success of their case and that they will not be scrutinized because 
they have hard forensic evidence to support their recitation of the facts.380 
Thus, not only can rape kits help expedite rape cases, but they can also ren-
der Crawford entirely moot by encouraging the availability of rape victims 
for cross-examination. 
Although many rape victims bravely choose to go to the hospital and 
undergo intrusive rape kit procedures in the event that they should choose to 
seek justice against and accuse their attacker, many of these rape kits re-
main in labs or police evidence rooms entirely untested.381 This means that 
DNA evidence of their attacker is collected but never analyzed, and the at-
tacker remains unidentified.382 The U.S. Department of Justice estimates 
there are one hundred thousand rape kits nationwide that have not yet been 
tested, and the media reports an even higher number of four hundred thou-
sand.383 This backlog significantly hinders the speed in which rape prosecu-
tions occur because so many rape prosecutions rely on DNA evidence, es-
pecially ones where the rapist is an unidentified stranger.384  
The Debbie Smith Reauthorization Act (the “Act”), which amends the 
Debbie Smith Act of 2004 and secures funding for the Debbie Smith DNA 
Backlog Grant Program through 2019, is a promising solution to the rape 
kit backlog.385 The program allocates grants to states and municipalities to 
help reduce and eventually eliminate the national DNA backlog by identify-
ing the reason or source behind backlogs in states.386 The grant program 
strives to provide training and education in the investigation of rape kits and 
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bring more transparency and accountability to the legal process of DNA 
analysis for victims.387 
Although funding under the grant program will continue through 2019, 
lobbying is needed to ensure that the Act will be continually reauthorized 
until there is sufficient funding to completely eliminate the backlog.388 By 
eliminating the rape kit backlog, the Act will encourage rape victims to be 
available for cross-examination by increasing the instances in which the 
time between the rape and the trial is minimized. It will also provide foren-
sic evidence to support the verbal claims made by the victim, thereby de-
creasing, if not extinguishing, any doubt the court or public may have in the 
victim’s allegations.389 Eliminating the rape kit backlog will also balance 
the inadmissibility of crucial testimonial hearsay with the admissibility of 
crucial DNA evidence; even if a victim still chooses to be unavailable for 
cross-examination in spite of a rape kit, any damage to the prosecutor’s case 
done by the victim’s absence can still be reversed by the admissibility of the 
rape kit as evidence, which will provide strong forensic support to the pros-
ecution.390 
2. Requiring Tamer Cross-Examination of Domestic Violence and Rape 
Victims During Trial 
A secondary approach to mitigating Crawford’s detrimental effects on 
domestic violence and rape cases is to relax the guidelines for cross-
examination. Because both domestic violence and rape victims choose to 
avoid availability at trial primarily due to the fear of facing their attacker or 
re-victimization during harsh and embarrassing cross-examination, guide-
lines for more sensitive cross-examination can encourage more availability 
of victim-declarants at trial.391 If more victims were available at trial, this 
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would ultimately eliminate potential problems that can arise from a defend-
ant’s right to confrontation. Such guidelines can prevent defense counsel 
from employing excessively cruel and callous cross-examination tactics that 
can make domestic violence and rape victims feel more fearful, vulnerable, 
and alone than they already feel on the stand.392 
Federal Rule of Evidence 611(a) would benefit victims of domestic vi-
olence and rape if states codified the rule, or a version of it, and uniformly 
applied it in all jurisdictions. Currently, not all state jurisdictions have 
adopted the rule.393 Rule 611(a) requires a court to “exercise reasonable 
control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting 
evidence so as to . . . protect witnesses from harassment or undue embar-
rassment.”394 In other words, Rule 611(a), if invoked by prosecutors, can set 
boundaries for cross-examination and restrain defense counsel from causing 
domestic violence and rape victims any further stress or hardship. This rule 
can provide comfort to victims of domestic violence and rape because their 
attorneys can object when the opposing party’s counsel is interrogating the 
victim in a grating, cruel, or severe manner that makes the victim uncom-
fortable.395 In doing so, the victim’s attorney can protect the victim from 
further discomfort that he or she would otherwise feel during a harsh and 
embarrassing cross-examination.396 By utilizing this rule consistently and 
more frequently through codification in all jurisdictions, prosecutors can 
ensure that victim-declarants will be more likely to cooperate with prosecu-
tion and be available for cross-examination, thereby preventing Crawford 
from banning the testimonial hearsay evidence that can convict their attack-
ers.397 
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Despite the aforementioned benefits of Rule 611(a), there are impedi-
ments to its ultimate success.398 Unfortunately, not all jurisdictions have 
adopted Rule 611(a) or a version of it.399 This lack of uniformity and con-
sistency in jurisdictions across the nation deprives victims of the assurance of 
protection during cross-examination that Rule 611(a) is intended to provide. 
Additionally, many critics claim that there is a lack of guidance and con-
sistency in the application of Rule 611(a) because it does not define what 
constitutes “harassment or undue embarrassment,” leaving that subjective 
determination up to the courts.400 Without a definition or guidance, critics 
warn that prosecutors are able to apply the rule too broadly because determi-
nations of what constitutes harassment and embarrassment can be subjective, 
thereby preventing effective cross-examination and hindering necessary com-
ponents of the trial and adversarial process.401 In other words, prosecutors 
may object to cross-examination too frequently under Rule 611(a) and disrupt 
the judicial process in doing so. On the other hand, proponents of the rule 
claim that in practice the discretion or subjectivity granted to prosecutors by 
the rule does not impede effective cross-examination because thus far, prose-
cutors have not exploited Rule 611(a) and have instead applied it selective-
ly.402  
Finally, many scholars have argued that Rule 611(a) is a difficult 
standard to meet.403 Not just any improper cross-examination tactic can be 
challenged by a prosecutor under the rule but, rather, there must be “strong 
evidence” of embarrassment or harassment.404 Some courts go as far as re-
quiring apparent physical signs of embarrassment or harassment, such as 
crying, before they invoke Rule 611(a), at which point the emotional pain 
the victim faces may be irreparable.405 Critics argue that this high standard 
renders the rule unnecessary because judges are likely to stop the cross-
examination before it escalates to that level.406 
For these reasons, Rule 611(a) might not be the most efficient tool for 
supporting and protecting domestic violence and rape victims during cross-
examination. However, because Rule 611(a) can help a victim feel more 
confident and safe in deciding to cooperate with prosecution and be availa-
ble for cross-examination, it is essential that states adopt, and prosecutors 
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invoke, this rule. To encourage courts to enforce these rules and create con-
sistent precedent, all jurisdictions should adopt and appropriately apply a 
form of Rule 611(a). Doing so would provide support and protection to do-
mestic violence and rape victims at trial, thereby preventing Crawford from 
hindering the prosecution.407 
3. Allowing Emotional or Psychological Support for Domestic Violence 
and Rape Victims During Trial 
Facing trial after domestic violence or rape is especially difficult for 
victims given the highly emotional and psychological components of these 
attacks.408 These types of attacks often create long-lasting impacts on vic-
tims, such as feelings of insecurity, vulnerability, and loneliness.409 Being 
put on the stand to testify in front of a courtroom full of people and their 
attacker can undoubtedly exacerbate these feelings. A domestic violence or 
rape victim assumes the obvious fear that accompanies having to face his or 
her attacker, someone who has already forced the victim to endure immense 
physical and psychological pain. Additionally, a victim in court must con-
front those present in the courtroom who are either unsure whether to be-
lieve the victim or are adamantly against believing the victim. Furthermore, 
discussing the event of an attack can cause the victim to relive the incident 
and the feelings that came with it, making it more painful and difficult to 
testify in a courtroom.410  
To help alleviate the trauma of discussing and being questioned about 
these attacks and facing their attackers, it would be beneficial for domestic 
violence and rape victims to have a support person—someone who the vic-
tim looks to as a source of strength, consolation, comfort, and understand-
ing—present in the courtroom. This type of person can be essential for these 
victims because in a time of weakness and vulnerability that stems from 
inner beliefs, memories, and feelings, victims often turn to external sources 
as means of strength and encouragement.411 
Some states have adopted statutes that allow rape and domestic vio-
lence victims to bring someone with them to trial, such as a family member, 
friend, counselor, or court-appointed advocate, who will provide emotional 
or psychological support during the trial.412 Such persons allow rape and 
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domestic violence victims to feel more comfortable testifying at trial and 
being cross-examined. Simply being able to see the face of someone who 
has supported the victim throughout the psychological hardships of their 
attack provides victims with a source of strength and comfort while on the 
witness stand.413 In fact, it is not even necessary for the person to speak or 
contribute in any way other than merely being present; this alone can help 
alleviate a victim’s anxiety, stress, depression, and trauma when it comes to 
cross-examination because the victim recognizes that the very purpose of 
the person’s presence in that courtroom is comfort and support for the vic-
tim. Additionally, by indicating to the courtroom that the victim is not 
alone, a support person may hinder any attempts by the attacker to intimi-
date the victim while he or she is testifying.414 
Critics suggest that although states that have adopted these support-
person rules also require that the person does not interfere with the judicial 
proceedings in any manner other than to be present for the victim, there 
may still be undue prejudice at a trial due to the presence of a support per-
son. This is because the mere presence of the support person may inevitably 
shed the victim in a vulnerable light.415 In doing so, the judge or jury may 
sympathize more with the victim, causing them to grant a more favorable 
ruling than they otherwise would have. Albeit a valid concern, the role of a 
support person is highly discreet; the rules regarding support persons pro-
hibit them from stopping what they believe to be an improper examina-
tion.416 For example, California’s application of its support-person rule re-
quires that, “if the presence of the support person interferes in any way with 
the testimony of the witness, the judge may remove the support person from 
court.”417 Rather, a support person can only be physically present as a focal 
point of strength for the victim who is being cross-examined about a highly 
sensitive event. Furthermore, most rules regarding support persons prohibit 
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ed by his or her perpetrator because the perpetrator sees power in numbers). For instance, if the 
victim did not have anyone at trial other than an attorney, then the perpetrator may presume that 
the victim is alone and abandoned, and therefore weaker and less resilient to intimidation—a 
seemingly easy target to manipulate. See id. 
 415 Id. 
 416 Id. 
 417 Id. at 1392 n.220 (citing PENAL § 868.5). 
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advocacy by the support person on behalf of the victim in any manner but 
support.418 
Another potential criticism of these support-person rules is that a sup-
port person for the victim at trial can serve as a detriment to the defend-
ant.419 Critics believe that the support person’s presence can create a bias 
that the defendant is a threatening person. On the other hand, it may also be 
a detriment to the victim because having a support person present in the 
courtroom could make the victim appear weak and therefore susceptible to 
harm. For this reason, not all victims may want a support person present at 
trial because they view their legal battle as part of their journey to recovery 
from their attack, and a part of that journey may be going about it as inde-
pendently as possible.420 This potential problem could be resolved by codi-
fying support-person rules in a way to ensure that the presence of a support 
person can be guaranteed at the behest of the victim.421 This is especially 
important because rape victims often feel as though their power of choice 
has been taken away from them.422 States that have not yet adopted a sup-
port-person rule and states that have should be lobbied to codify and amend 
this rule, respectively, to allow for the presence of support persons at tri-
al.423 Doing so will encourage many rape and domestic violence victims to 
be available for cross-examination, thereby alleviating the destructive im-
pacts that Crawford otherwise has on cases where the victim-declarant is 
unavailable at trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Evidently, Crawford v. Washington and its progeny can be a significant 
detriment to the prosecution of rape and domestic violence cases by keeping 
testimonial hearsay—evidence that is often essential for a conviction—out 
of trial when victims of such cases are unavailable for cross-examination. 
Subsequently, perpetrators of these crimes are going free, leaving a trail of 
more victims in their path, and leaving their own victims who chose not to 
confront them to feel responsible and guilty—feelings that victims already 
                                                                                                                           
 418 Lininger, supra note 147, at 1393 n.223 (citing Commonwealth v. Harris, 567 N.E.2d 899, 
905 (Mass. 1991) (despite finding no reversible error, “the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts expressed consternation that a victim’s advocate held the hand of the decedent’s mother dur-
ing a murder trial”)). 
 419 Id. at 1392–94. 
 420 See WANG & ROWLEY, supra note 175, at 44–45; Lininger, supra note 147, at 1392–94. 
 421 Lininger, supra note 147, at 1392–93. 
 422 See generally WANG & ROWLEY, supra note 175 (discussing the psychological effects of 
sexual violence and the importance of empowering victims with the ability to make their own 
decisions in seeking recourse). 
 423 See Lininger, supra note 147, at 1392 n.221 (explaining that a total of fourteen states have 
enacted statutes permitting support persons in the courtroom). 
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suffering from the psychological harm caused by domestic violence and 
rape should not have to endure. 
Crawford creates this effect in cases of domestic violence and rape 
more detrimentally than in others due to the unique psychological compo-
nents surrounding these cases—components which cannot be ignored as 
they are the inevitable painful effects the victims of these cases endure. For 
instance, even when initially determining whether Crawford’s application is 
even appropriate in a domestic violence or rape case, courts fail to recog-
nize the psychological components of these cases. Because Crawford only 
applies to testimonial hearsay, courts must carefully consider the unique 
psychological circumstances that may make a statement testimonial in a 
domestic violence or rape case, but not in another type of case. Yet, courts 
commonly, though incorrectly and inconsistently, consider domestic violence 
and rape victims’ statements testimonial despite the fact that these cases are 
characterized by lasting psychological effects, whether through the cyclical 
and manipulative nature of domestic violence or the vivid post-traumatic 
flashbacks of rapes, that create an ongoing state of emergency long after a 
911 telephone call is placed. 
Additionally, domestic violence and rape victims are particularly sus-
ceptible to becoming unavailable for cross-examination for psychological 
reasons such as being manipulated by their relationship with their attacker, 
being afraid to face their attacker, or being violated and biasedly distrusted 
by the harshness and invasiveness of court proceedings. As a result of this 
increase in likelihood of unavailability of domestic violence and rape vic-
tims in conjunction with the fact that Crawford calls for victims’ availability 
to admit crucial hearsay evidence in spite of the unique psychological com-
ponents inducing their unavailability, prosecutors are reluctant to pursue 
these cases. In turn, perpetrators of domestic violence and rape are not con-
victed or often even tried, and their victims are left not only to fear another 
attack on themselves, but also to fear an attack on others that will leave 
them bearing that weight of responsibility and guilt on their shoulders. 
To help ameliorate the destructive impacts of Crawford on domestic 
violence and rape cases, state legislatures, and, in some cases, Congress, 
must be lobbied to adopt the following remedies: (1) restrict the definition 
of testimonial to never include excited utterances, present sense impres-
sions, and statements made to medical personnel; (2) expand the definition 
of ongoing emergency to include up to twenty-four hours after a rape or a 
domestic violence attack; (3) codify the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine; 
and (4) improve safeguards for victims before and during trial, including 
reducing the time between investigation and cross-examination, enforcing 
more sensitive cross-examination practices, and permitting emotional or 
psychological support systems at trial for victims of rape and domestic vio-
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lence. As a result of the violent crimes committed against them, rape and 
domestic violence victims continue to suffer psychologically and emotion-
ally. It is the job of the criminal justice system to not add to that pain and 
suffering, but to instead recognize and protect the sensitive nature of these 
cases and these victims. If adopted, the proposed changes articulated in this 
Article could ultimately help “many domestic violence [and rape] cases to 
be swept out from under the strictures of Crawford . . . .”424 
                                                                                                                           
 424 Meier, supra note 2, at 27. 
